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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BATSON: MIXED 
MOTIVES AND DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
Russell D. Covey
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude jurors on account of protected characteristics 
such as race and sex. Mixed-motive problems arise where the 
proponent of a strike confesses to have been motivated by a 
combination of proper and improper purposes.  In other contexts, 
so-called “mixed-motive analysis,” which provides the challenged 
party an opportunity to prove that the “same decision” would have 
been made absent the improper motive, has been permitted.  The 
United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled, however, on whether 
“mixed-motive” analysis is consistent with the governing framework 
set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, and those state and federal courts 
that have addressed the issue have reached different conclusions.  
This Article argues that the mixed-motive defense should not be 
permitted under Batson. That tool was developed in a very different 
context, serves purposes not relevant to discrimination in jury 
selection, and undermines Batson’s basic goals. The Article 
proposes adoption instead of a “motivating” or “substantial” factor 
test, as currently used in Title VII mixed-motive cases, to determine 
when peremptory strikes based on mixed motives violate the 
Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
The lawfulness of both state and private conduct frequently 
depends on the purposes that motivated the conduct, and a wide 
range of statutory and constitutional law renders otherwise lawful 
actions unlawful if they are motivated by an illicit purpose. Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for instance, prohibits employers from 
making employment decisions on the basis of race, sex, religion, or 
nationality,1 and the First Amendment bars the government from 
firing an employee because of her exercise of protected speech 
1
 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 
2000e-17 [hereinafter “Title VII”]).  
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rights.2  Whenever such actions are the subject of legal challenge, 
courts ultimately must determine what purpose or motive caused the 
actor to pursue the challenged course of action.  Motivations, 
however, are complex; decisions are often made for multiple 
purposes.  Sometimes, the purposes motivating those actions reflect 
a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate objectives, raising what has 
frequently been referred to as the “mixed motive” problem.  
The mixed-motive problem raises especially troubling 
implications in the context of jury selection.  The Supreme Court 
long ago recognized that the exclusion of jurors from the venire 
because of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.3  As with employment decisions under Title 
VII, the lawfulness of a peremptory strike to exclude a juror from the 
venire turns on the proponent’s purpose.  Although peremptory 
strikes traditionally have permitted the parties to exclude any juror 
for any reason, or for no reason, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme 
Court held that a peremptory strike is unconstitutional if it is used to 
exclude a juror on account of race.4  Not surprisingly, courts 
adjudicating Batson disputes have encountered the same mixed-
motive problem that arises in other kinds of disputes the resolution 
of which turns on the purposes of the actor.
In other areas of law, the Supreme Court has sanctioned what 
is often referred to as “dual-motive” or, as here, “mixed-motive” 
analysis.5  Mixed-motive analysis provides a party that has been 
proven to have acted from an unlawful motive an affirmative 
defense to demonstrate that it would have chosen the same course of 
action, or made the “same decision,” entirely from other lawful 
2
 Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287 (1977).
3
 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).  At least since 1954, the Court has 
acknowledged that the “constitutional command” of the equal protection clause prevents 
prosecutors from excluding not only blacks from jury service, but any “identifiable group 
in the community which may be the subject of prejudice.”  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202, 204 (1965) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1945)) (holding that equal 
protection clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of ancestry and national origin as 
well as race).
4
 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5 See Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287 (1977)), 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also infra Parts I.A-B.
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motives.6  Depending on the specific area in which the same-
decision defense is asserted, success in showing that the unlawful 
motive was not the “but-for” cause of the challenged action can 
result in anything from a mere limitation on damages to complete 
vindication on the merits.  Although the first state courts to 
encounter the mixed-motive problem in Batson rejected the use of 
mixed-motive analysis, and several state courts continue to bar its 
use, a small but steadily growing number of courts, including all six 
federal circuit courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue, have 
permitted or affirmatively endorsed its use.7  The Supreme Court, 
however, has not yet sanctioned the use of mixed-motive analysis in 
the Batson context.  
In this Article, I argue that the turn to mixed-motive analysis 
in jury selection is a serious mistake, one that threatens to undermine 
the fragile foundations upon which Batson stands.  The argument 
proceeds as follows.  Part I sets out the origins of mixed-motive 
analysis, showing how the Supreme Court crafted that analysis from 
a variety of disparate sources as an analogue to two doctrines of 
criminal procedure: the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, and the 
doctrine of harmless error.  The standard was chosen as an express 
alternative to more traditional tort-law causation standards, 
notwithstanding the Court’s frequent reliance on basic tort constructs 
in its equal protection jurisprudence.  After considering the general 
origins and functions of mixed-motive analysis, the Article discusses 
three ways state and federal courts have responded to the mixed-
motive problem in the jury-selection context.  First, some courts 
have held that a prosecutor’s admission of any improper bias “taints” 
a strike and requires invalidation under Batson.8  Second, other 
courts have in effect disregarded the improper reason and utilized 
the regular Batson framework in an attempt to determine whether the 
permissible reasons were legitimate or “pretextual.”9  Third, a 
growing number of courts have invoked mixed-motive analysis to 
assess whether such mixed explanations are consistent with Batson.10
6 See infra Part I.A (discussing mixed-motive defense).
7 See infra nn. 111-116 (citing cases).
8 See infra notes 94-100.
9 See infra note 179.  
10 See infra notes 105-116.  
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Part II assesses the propriety of these various responses under the 
formal Batson framework.  It establishes that, given the governing 
equal protection standards, a peremptory strike is facially invalid 
where the strike’s proponent attempts to justify it with a mixed-
motive explanation.  Part II further demonstrates that once a finding 
of mixed-motives has been made, it is erroneous to proceed any 
further under the conventional Batson framework.  
Some courts that have relied on mixed-motive analysis, 
however, have treated the mixed-motive defense as a supplement to 
the Batson framework.  Part III shows how and why supplementing 
Batson with mixed-motive analysis is inappropriate and destructive 
of Batson’s purposes.  Batson serves important symbolic, deterrent, 
and diversity-enhancing functions.  The use of mixed-motive 
analysis undermines each of these functions.  Mixed-motive analysis 
also detracts from Batson’s important evidentiary function of easing 
the crippling burden of proof that, prior to Batson, had prevented 
practical enforcement of equal protection doctrine in jury selection. 
Rather than make it easier to prove discrimination, mixed-motive 
analysis encourages obfuscation, fails to recognize subconscious 
bias, and substantially complicates an already highly speculative and
easily-evaded inquiry.  
The better solution, Part IV argues, is stringent enforcement 
of Batson’s narrow neutrality requirement through application of the 
same causation test that Congress has relied upon to resolve the 
mixed-motive problem in the Title VII context.  As Congress 
recognized, to determine whether an equal protection violation has 
occurred in a mixed-motive case, the question to ask is whether an 
improper criterion was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor for the 
challenged strike.  This standard has long been used in tort cases 
involving multiple sufficient causes.  As in those cases, the more 
restrictive “same-decision” test’s insistence on “but-for” causation 
leads to unjust results and permits wrongdoers to escape liability for 
their concededly wrongful conduct.  Because the primary concerns 
that motivated the creation of the mixed-motive defense – windfall 
protection and harmless error review – are not relevant in the unique 
context of peremptory challenge regulation, the use of that defense 
in Batson cases is not appropriate, and should not be permitted.  
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Instead, Batson and its progeny are best read to bar any peremptory 
strike in which race, ethnicity, or gender was a “substantial” or 
“motivating” factor for its exercise; permitting such race-based 
strikes under the guise of “mixed-motive” would render Batson’s 
already meager protections “unbearably” light.
I. MIXED-MOTIVE ANALYSIS AND BATSON
With Batson, the Court attempted to impose meaningful 
prohibitions on the use of race-based peremptory challenges for the 
first time.  Several subsequent cases, handed down in quick 
succession, broadened and deepened the core principle of Batson
that peremptory strikes may not be used to mask or advance 
invidious discriminatory purposes.  The Batson rule now applies not 
only to the exclusion of jurors on account of race, but also to 
exclusions on account of gender and ethnicity; 11 it may be invoked 
by the prosecutor as well as the defendant;12 it applies in civil actions 
as well as criminal prosecutions;13 and it can be invoked regardless 
of whether the excluded jurors are of the same race, ethnicity, or 
gender as the objecting party.14
Although there is no shortage of critics to point out that 
Batson has not eradicated discrimination in jury selection,15 it is 
11 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-366 (1991) (recognizing applicability 
of Batson prohibition to ethnic minorities (hispanics); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 
528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (citing Hernandez as involving challenges based on “ethnic 
origin”); J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying Batson to strikes 
based on gender).  At present, it is unclear whether Batson also prohibits the use of 
peremptories based on religion.  See John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors 
Based Upon or Affecting Religion, 34 SETON HALL. L. REV. 435 (2004) (arguing that 
Batson should be extended to bar religion-based challenges).
12 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
13 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
14 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
15 See, e.g., Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: 
Are They Constitutional? 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 139, 199 (stating that “most commentators 
and practicing lawyers feel that Batson and its progeny have not only stopped short of 
destroying peremptory challenges but have been so ineffective that they have rarely 
stopped peremptory challenges based only on unambiguously unconstitutional criteria
such as race or gender”); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir 
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 
209-210 (1989); David Cole, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 120 (The New Press 1999) (arguing that 
“Batson .. is generally ineffective at stopping even blatant racists"); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., 
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beyond dispute that it has had a major impact on criminal procedure.  
Litigation under Batson has proliferated, and Batson objections are 
now an important weapon in the defense lawyer’s arsenal, both at 
trial and on appeal.16   Moreover, there is reason to believe that 
Batson has succeeded, at least at the margins, in eliminating the most 
overt forms of racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination from jury 
selection.17
There is also reason to believe the Court will continue to 
attempt to advance Batson’s basic goals.  Its decision last term in 
Miller-El v. Dretke,18 for instance, displayed a remarkable 
impatience with the Fifth Circuit’s willingness to overlook quite 
pronounced discriminatory practices. Capping a protracted struggle 
with the Fifth Circuit that required not one but two decisions, the 
Court invoked Batson to reverse Thomas Miller-El’s 20-year-old 
murder conviction, overriding state and federal court findings that 
the convictions were not tainted by racial discrimination.19  But if 
Miller-El raises hope that courts at the highest levels will no longer 
abide overt discrimination in jury selection, another development in 
the lower federal courts’ Batson jurisprudence – the slow but steady 
advance of “mixed-motive” analysis – threatens to undermine that 
promise.  
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate 
Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 213 (2003) (arguing that Batson “has, in practice, been 
decidedly ineffective in achieving its original goals”).
16
 A Lexis-Nexis search for the words “Batson” and “jury” limited to state and federal 
cases cases reported during the calendar year of 2005 alone produced 556 hits.
17 See, e.g., David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner,  
Barbara Broffitt, Symposium: The Use Of Peremptory Challenges In Capital Murder 
Trials: A Legal And Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 123 (2001) (concluding 
that empirical study of jury selection practices in Philadelphia shows that Supreme 
Court’s “prohibitions against the use of race and gender as the basis for the use of 
peremptories have had, at best, only a marginal impact on the peremptory strike strategies 
of each side”).
18
 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). 
19
 The Court found the state court’s conclusion to be an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence, indicating a rare willingness to overturn factual findings 
on habeas review, and emphasizing that “[t]he standing is demanding but not insatiable; 
as we said the last time this case was here, ‘[d]eference does not by definition preclude 
relief’”) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2002)).
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A. Origins of Mixed-Motive Analysis
Mixed-motive analysis originated in two Supreme Court 
cases: Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle,20 and Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.21
These cases suggest that the mixed-motive test was devised 
primarily for two seemingly disparate purposes: to establish a 
remedial limitation in tort-like actions against the government, and 
to limit the ability of plaintiffs to challenge legislative and 
administrative actions based on evidence that some members of the 
governing body harbored some type of illicit bias.  As will be 
discussed below, there is a conceptual link between these functions.  
In both instances, the problem motivating the use of mixed-motive 
looks like a kind of “harmless error” review.  
Mt. Healthy, which has been described as a “mixed-motives 
constitutional tort case,”22 illustrates mixed-motive analysis’ 
remedial limitation focus.  The case involved an untenured teacher 
named Doyle, who during a period in which there were substantial 
tensions between Doyle and the school board regarding, inter alia, 
the teacher dress code, reported the contents of a school 
memorandum on the teacher dress code to a radio disk jockey, who 
in turn promptly reported it as news.23  One month later, the school 
board decided not to renew Doyle’s contract. When Doyle requested 
an explanation, the school superintendent gave several reasons, 
including Doyle’s call to the radio station.24 Doyle challenged the 
school board’s decision not to rehire him, arguing that the decision 
to terminate his contract was an act of retaliation for his exercise of 
his First Amendment rights.  The District Court held that Doyle was 
entitled to reinstatement, reasoning that “Doyle’s telephone call to 
20
 429 U.S. 274 (1977).  See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1260 (1988) (identifying Mt. Healthy as “[t]he doctrinal 
genesis of the ‘same decision’ test of causation).
21
 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
22
 Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court’s 
Rhetoric and its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1, 65 (1998) (quoting Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.6 
(3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995).
23
 429 U.S. at 282.
24 Id. at 282-283 and n.1.
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the radio station was ‘clearly protected by the First Amendment,’ 
and … played a ‘substantial part’ in the decision of the Board not to 
renew Doyle’s employment.”25  The Court of Appeals affirmed.26
The language used by the District Court suggests that it 
analyzed the causation issue borrowing principles from tort law.  In 
tort, an act normally is considered a legal cause of a harm only if it is 
the “but-for” cause, that is, an act may be a legal cause of the 
“plaintiff’s damage if but for its commission the damage would not 
have happened.”27   But the common law of torts recognizes an 
exception to the strict requirement of but-for causation in cases of 
multiple sufficient causes, where the wrongful conduct was 
sufficient to bring about the harm but there was another separate and 
independent force that would have brought about the same harm.28
In that instance, even though the harm would have occurred anyway 
as a result of the other cause, as long as the actor’s wrongful conduct 
was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm, the actor may 
be held liable.29  Mixed-motive cases can be analogized to multiple 
25 Id. at 283 (quoting unpublished opinion of district court).
26 See Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education, 529 F.2d 524 (6th
Cir. 1975) (table decision).
27
 Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 946 (1935).  Of 
course, normally, but-for causation is not enough; there must also be proximate 
causation.  Traditional tort law principles thus further require that the wrongful conduct 
not only was the but-for cause of the harm, but also was a “substantial factor” in causing 
the harm to occur.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
28
 The exception is longstanding.  See, e.g., Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of 
Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 109 n.20 (noting exception to proposition that liability 
requires but-for causation “where two or more tortious causes are simultaneously 
operating, each being independent of the other, and each being alone sufficient to 
produce the damaging result”); Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902). 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §432 (2), at 430.  The “substantial factor” test was 
first developed by Judge and tort-scholar Jeremiah Smith.  See Jeremiah Smith, Legal 
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103 , 303, 309-314 (1912). Recognition of 
the exception has been noted in numerous cases.  See, e.g., McElwee v. Wharton  7 
Fed.Appx. 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “Michigan law is clear that when multiple
factors contribute to a plaintiff's injury, liability may be imposed when a defendant's 
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injury.”); Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 
155 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he substantial factor standard … has 
been embraced as a clearer rule of causation [than the 'but for' test]-one which subsumes 
the 'but for' test while reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, such as 
those involving independent or concurrent causes in fact”). See infra, Part IV.B 
(discussing the substantial factor test in tort law).
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sufficient causation cases, in that two concurrent “forces” – a legal 
motive and an illegal one – both “cause” an actor to follow a 
particular course of action.  The district court apparently applied this 
tort-law causation principle, and upon finding that the Board’s 
consideration of protected conduct played a “substantial part” in its 
decision not to renew the contract, concluded that Doyle had carried 
his burden of proof on the causation issue.
In an opinion authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, the 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the tort-based approach used 
by the District Court in which proof that the exercise of first 
amendment rights played a “substantial part” in the board’s decision 
mandated judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.  Such a standard, the 
Court indicated, could bestow an undeserved windfall on Doyle.  
The Court reasoned that “[t]he constitutional principle at stake is 
sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a 
position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.”30  Although it 
recognized that the board had acted unlawfully in considering 
Doyle’s protected conduct, it apparently believed that Doyle was not 
entitled to reinstatement if the Board would have terminated his 
contract regardless of the scuffle over his exercise of First 
Amendment rights.31
Instead of relying on tort causation standards to determine 
whether the constitutionally-protected conduct was a “cause” of the 
decision to terminate Doyle’s contract, as the district court did, 
Justice Rehnquist looked for guidance to analyze the problem of 
mixed motives in an unlikely source: constitutional criminal 
procedure.  Reviewing a variety of confession and exclusionary rule 
cases in which the admissibility of evidence turned on whether the 
evidence was obtained “because of” unlawful police conduct,32
30 Id. at 285-286.
31 Id. at 286 (reasoning that reinstatement would not be commensurate with the harm if 
the Board were “precluded, because it considered constitutionally protected conduct in 
deciding not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a trier of fact that quite apart
from such conduct Doyle’s record was such that he would not have been rehired in any 
event.”).
32 See id. at 286 (noting that “[I]n other areas of constitutional law, this Court has found it 
necessary to formulate a test of causation which distinguishes between a result caused by 
a constitutional violation and one not so caused,” and that  “those are instructive in 
formulating the test to be applied here,” and citing Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64 
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Rehnquist cobbled together a causation standard that permits the 
defendant to argue, as a functional affirmative defense, that there 
was not a sufficient causal link between the constitutional violation 
and the adverse action.  Under this so-called “same decision” 
defense,33 once the plaintiff establishes that his constitutionally 
protected conduct “was a ‘substantial’ ... or ... ‘motivating factor’ in 
the [alleged wrongdoer]’s decision not to rehire him,” the defendant 
retains the opportunity to show, “by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have reached the same decision ... even in the absence 
of the protected conduct.”34  In invoking these criminal procedure 
precedents in Mt. Healthy, the Court established a causation defense, 
the breadth of which was not then made clear, but which operated in 
Mt. Healthy to award the benefit of a causally overdetermined result 
to the governmental entity.  This narrow causation doctrine provides 
that if the permissible motivations for the government’s action 
constituted an “independent source” of the adverse result, then that 
result cannot be fairly blamed on the impermissible motive, and no 
remedy is warranted.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation, which utilized the same burden-shifting framework 
and which was decided the same day, illustrates a second and 
seemingly quite different function of the mixed-motive test: the 
development of a methodology to review claims of unconstitutional 
motivation in legislative or administrative decisionmaking.  In 
Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs sought a zoning variance from the 
Village to permit construction of a low-income housing project that 
was expected to benefit minorities. After the application was denied, 
the plaintiffs brought an equal protection challenge against the 
Village, and presented proof that some zoning board members were 
in fact motivated by racially-discriminatory purposes.  That proof 
alone, however, was insufficient to overturn the zoning board’s 
decision. As the Court explained:
S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481 (1944); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963); 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 34 (1939); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 
790, 796 (1970)).
33 See Belton, supra note 20, at 1369-1370 (describing Mt. Healthy framework as creating 
the “‘same decision’ defense”).
34
 429 U.S. at 287.
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Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in 
part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not 
necessarily have required invalidation of the 
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have 
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that 
the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered.35
The framework adopted in Arlington Heights, in which the 
burden of proof shifts to the defendant upon proof that an illicit 
criteria was a motivating factor in the decision, was lifted directly 
from Mt. Healthy.  Its application in this very different context, 
however, reflects a rejection of the approach to the review of 
legislative motive embodied in the Court’s controversial decision in 
Palmer v. Thompson.36  In Palmer, the Court refused to overturn the 
city of Jackson, Mississippi’s decision to shut down its public 
swimming pools rather than operate them on an integrated basis,37
reasoning that motive was irrelevant to the question of whether state 
action violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Arlington Heights, 
the Supreme Court reconceptualized the role that motive should play 
in the constitutional inquiry along the lines sketched out by 
Professor Paul Brest in his influential article on the problem.38
There are three types of responses to a scenario in which 
evidence shows that a decisionmaker harbored an illicit motive.  
First, one could ignore the evidence, as the Court did in Palmer.  
Second, one could find a per se equal protection violation.  Third, 
one might require one of the parties to prove that the illicit motive 
“mattered.” Decrying any “blanket refusal to inquire into legislative 
and administrative motivation,” but acknowledging the difficulties 
of judicial review of motivation that arise regarding “proof, 
appropriate relief, and respect for political processes,” Brest urged 
35
 429 U.S. at 271 n.21.  
36
 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
37 Id. at 218-19.
38 See Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. 266 n.11 (citing Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An 
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 
116-118).
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the third course.39  Although equal protection doctrine accords 
decisions based on race the strictest level of scrutiny, courts are 
nonetheless expected to exercise great restraint in reviewing 
legislative enactments, and when they do, to grant such enactments 
the presumption of regularity.40  But that deference must end where 
the decisionmaker acts from a flatly unconstitutional motive.  As 
Professor Brest had argued, “[I]f the decisionmaker gave weight to 
an illicit objective, the court should presume that his consideration of 
the objective determined the outcome of the decision and should 
invalidate the decision in the absence of clear proof to the 
contrary.”41  Because it is reasonable to presume that an illicit motive 
had a causal influence on the outcome, such proof “rebuts whatever 
presumption of regularity otherwise attaches.”42  Furthermore, it is 
fair to “place on the decisionmaker a heavy burden of proving that 
his illicit objective was not determinative of the outcome.”43
Accordingly, legislative or administrative enactments can withstand 
challenge where the state can demonstrate that even though the illicit 
purpose infected the decisionmaking process, it was not the “but-
for” cause of the decision.
The “same-decision” test functions much like a “harmless 
error” doctrine for purposes of evaluating legislative motive.44
Under the harmless constitutional error doctrine, a trial marred by 
constitutional error does not per se mandate reversal of a conviction.  
As set forth in the leading constitutional harmless error case, 
Chapman v. California, “there may be some constitutional errors 
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and 
39 See id. at 134-135.
40 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson  515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (explaining that “[a]lthough 
race-based decisionmaking is inherently suspect, until a claimant makes a showing 
sufficient to support that allegation the good faith of a state legislature must be 
presumed”) (internal quotations omitted).
41 See Brest, supra note 38, at 117-118.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 118.
44 See, e.g., Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir.1980) (characterizing same-
decision test as “harmless error” test). Indeed, if the Court found support for the mixed-
motive framework in the theoretical approach advocated by Professor Brest, he in turn 
looked to harmless constitutional error doctrine as a model. See Brest, supra note 38, at 
118 n.114 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, 
be deemed harmless.”45  However, because of the potential for 
injustice, a more stringent standard of review is required where a 
conviction is tainted by constitutional error.  Whereas under the 
conventional harmless error rules, a conviction may be affirmed 
merely upon a showing that the error did not affect the defendant’s 
substantial rights,46 where a constitutional right has been breached, 
an error can be found harmless only if the prosecutor carries the 
higher burden of proving that the error “was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”47  As Professor Brest reasoned, proof that the 
decisionmaker “is known to have taken account of constitutionally 
illicit objectives, together with the probability that the objectives 
were outcome-determinative,” justify shifting this “heavy burden” of 
proof to the decisionmaker.48  In invoking the same-decision test, the 
Court in Arlington Heights fairly faithfully followed Brest’s 
approach.
In the equal protection context, the Mt. Healthy/Arlington 
Heights “same decision” test has been used primarily as a tool to 
evaluate legislative motive.  In fact, the Supreme Court’s only two 
equal protection cases in which it has invoked the Mt. Healthy same-
decision test have arisen in this context.49  In those cases, the mixed-
motive defense has functioned like a harmless error test for 
collective decisionmaking, whereby the Court has declined to 
invoked a per se rule of invalidation.  Instead, it has indicated that 
the normal deference owed the decisionmaker upon finding that the 
decisionmaking process was marred by consideration of an 
unconstitutional objective would be withdrawn.  Evidence that a 
decision was tainted by discriminatory motive creates a presumption 
of error that can be overcome, however, if the government can 
demonstrate that the discriminatory motive was causally “harmless.”
45
 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
46 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
47
 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
48
 Brest, supra note 38, at 118 n.114.
49 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (considering challenge to denial of re-
zoning request alleged to have been motivated by race discrimination); Hunter v. 
Underwood, 71 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that felon disenfranchisement law was the 
product of discriminatory purpose, notwithstanding additional “neutral” purpose of 
disenfranchising poor whites).
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Although the purposes of mixed-motive analysis in the two 
cases appear distinct, there is a common thread that ties them 
together.  In both cases, the availability of the defense provides the 
court with a tool to deny relief notwithstanding evidence that the 
decisionmaker harbored an unlawful motive, where the effect of 
judicial intervention would be costly to the government and largely 
futile.  In constitutional tort cases such as Mt. Healthy, a court order 
requiring a government employer to reconsider its decision to 
withhold tenure is likely to be ineffective if there are other, 
reasonable grounds for the decision, and awarding him damages 
would simply result in a windfall.  In legislative motive cases, 
invalidation of the legislative enactment would likely be futile if the 
legislature can simply repass the same statute by rephrasing its 
intended goals.  
B. Mixed-Motive and Title VII
Although originally crafted in the constitutional context 
described above, mixed-motive analysis quickly found a home in 
employment discrimination law,50 and particularly in the 
adjudication of claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.51  Mixed-motive analysis received its most extensive 
treatment in the Title VII context in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 52
Prior to Price Waterhouse, there was widespread disagreement 
among the lower courts regarding the proper causation standards to 
apply in mixed-motive Title VII cases.53  Although some Circuits 
had applied the Mt. Healthy causation rule, others held that a 
50 See N.L.R.B. v. Trans. Management; East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. 
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that the company's 
failure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was entitled to 
prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not qualified 
and would not have been hired in any event” (citing International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 369 n. 53 (1977), and Mt. Healthy City Board 
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287 (1977)).
51
 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 
2000e-17 [hereinafter “Title VII”]).  See Sheila A. Skojec, Effect of Mixed or Dual 
Motives in Actions Under Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunities Subchapter) of 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.); 83 A.L.R. Fed. 268 (collecting 
cases).
52
 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
53 Id. at 238 n.2 (citing cases).
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violation of Title VII was complete for liability purposes upon proof 
that it had been motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory 
purpose.54
The Price Waterhouse case resolved that dispute.  Ann 
Hopkins, who had been nominated for partnership at the accounting 
firm Price Waterhouse, was the only female candidate of the 88 
persons proposed for partnership that year.  Although Hopkins 
performance at the firm compared favorably with the other 
partnership candidates, there were some legitimate criticisms of her 
performance and ability.55  At the same time, there was substantial 
evidence that some Price Waterhouse partners held Hopkins to a 
higher standard because she was a woman.56  In short, the evidentiary 
record demonstrated that both legitimate and illegitimate factors 
motivated the decision to reject her partnership bid.  
The case squarely raised the issue of what “standard of 
causation” under Title VII was sufficient to establish a statutory 
violation in a mixed-motive case.  The defendant advocated a 
standard that would have required Hopkins, who had shown that her 
gender played a part in an employment decision, to prove but-for 
causation – that “the decision would have been different if the 
employer had not discriminated.”57  Hopkins, on the other hand, 
argued for a per se rule – that liability should be complete upon a 
showing that an impermissible criterion played “any part in an 
employment decision.”58
54 See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco  741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 
1984) (Kennedy, J.) (distinguishing between liability and remedial standards in Title VII 
cases, and holding as to former that “where employment discrimination affects the 
applicant's score or the evaluative process, it suffices to impose initial liability to find that 
sex was a significant factor in the decision not to process an application further or in the 
decision to terminate an employee,” but as to latter, “an award of back pay or an order of 
reinstatement is appropriate only if the discrimination is a but for cause of the disputed 
employment action, and it follows that a showing of nonqualification would bar such 
relief”). 
55
 490 U.S. at 234. 
56 Id. at 235-236.
57 Id. at 237-238.
58 Id. at 238.  Hopkins further argued that the employer should, at most, be permitted to 
prove that “it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination,” 
which would merely limit equitable relief.  Id.
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In a splintered opinion, the Court rejected both positions.  
Writing for a plurality, Justice Brennan crafted a compromise 
approach, which he attempted to defend using the language of tort 
law.59  Invoking the multiple sufficient cause doctrine in tort, 
Brennan argued that it makes no sense to say that a causally 
overdetermined outcome, for instance, one in which two forces 
operate on an object and both forces are sufficient to disturb the 
object – has no cause.  Instead, Brennan reasoned, it makes more 
sense to say that both forces were “causes” of the outcome.60  As 
noted above, in the case of multiple sufficient causation, tort law has 
long held that proof that the defendant’s wrongful conduct was a 
“substantial factor” in the outcome is sufficient to warrant holding 
the defendant liable for the harm, even if his wrongful conduct was 
not “strictly speaking” the but-for cause of the harm.  Like the 
district court in Mt. Healthy, the plurality indicated that the 
substantial factor test was the proper standard, and that “[t]he 
question is not whether the other causes would have been sufficient 
without the defendant’s wrong, but whether the defendant’s wrong 
was actually a material factor in producing the injury.”61  Applying 
that logic, Brennan asserted that a Title VII plaintiff carries her 
burden on the issue of causation if she establishes that a 
discriminatory criterion was a substantial factor relied upon by the 
employer in reaching its decision.62  That other motives also 
influenced the employer’s decision does not negate the causal 
significance of the illicit motive, since “Title VII meant to condemn 
even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate considerations.”63  The plurality reasoned that the 
plaintiff is not required to prove “but-for causation” because the 
statute focuses on the actual conduct of employers.  In a case where 
an adverse employment decision was motivated in fact by an illicit 
criterion – in other words, where the improper criterion was actually 
59 See Maatman, supra note 22, at 18 (noting that plurality in Price Waterhouse case 
employed legal language borrowed from tort law “to justify its causation standard”).
60
 490 U.S. at 241.
61
 Carpenter, supra note 27, at 952.
62 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241-242.
63 Id. at 241.
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in the heads of the decisionmaker – the purposes of the statute have 
been contravened. 
The plurality’s adherence to the tort multiple sufficient
causation model, however, ended there.  In an analytical move 
rightly criticized by the dissent as internally inconsistent, the 
plurality, joined by Justices White and O’Connor, went on to hold 
that although the plaintiff has carried her burden on the causation 
issue by proving that an illicit criteria was a “substantial” or 
“motivating factor” in the decision, the defendant could nonetheless 
avert an ultimate determination of liability if it could establish, under 
the “mixed-motive” standard set forth in Mt. Healthy and Arlington 
Heights, that the illicit criteria was not the “but-for cause” of the 
decision.64  But-for causation, the Price Waterhouse court indicated, 
was a necessary ingredient in a Title VII liability determination, but 
the Court agreed that the burden to prove lack of but-for causation 
should shift to the defendant, a wrongdoer who “knowingly created 
the risk” that but-for causation cannot be proven one way or the 
other, “not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.”65  A 
majority of justices agreed that “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case 
shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by 
64 Id. at 247 n.12 (noting dissent’s failure to explain why the evidentiary scheme endorsed 
in Mt. Healthy was not workable in Title VII cases); id. at 258 (White, J., concurring) 
(“to determine the proper approach to causation in this case, we need look only to the 
Court’s opinion in Mt. Healthy”); id. at 268 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (relying on 
Arlington Heights).  The Court also relied heavily on a case arising under federal labor 
law, NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), which also 
utilized the same mixed-motive framework set forth in Mt. Healthy.  See id. at 403.  
According to the Court, once the factfinder establishes that the challenged action was 
motivated in part by discriminatory animus, the burden shifts to the challenged party to 
“carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision.” Id. at 248. The challenged party, “if 
it wishes to prevail, must persuade” the factfinder “by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have reached the same decision” even absent the impermissible motive.  Id. 
at 249.
65 Id. at 250 (plurality opinion) (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 
403).  See also id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that allocation of burden of 
proof with respect to causation was appropriate “where the employer has created
uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible 
criterion”). 
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proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not 
allowed gender to play such a role.”66
As the dissent noted, the plurality’s simultaneous assertions 
that an adverse employment decision is “because of” sex as long as 
sex was considered by the employer in making the decision and that 
an employer is not liable if it ‘can prove that sex was not a but-for 
cause of the decision’ cannot both be true.”67
Although the Court faltered in carrying through with the 
logical parallel with the multiple sufficient causation doctrine in 
Title VII mixed-motive cases, Congress moved swiftly to correct it.  
In response to Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII in 
1991 to clarify that a plaintiff who establishes that an adverse 
employment decision was made because of mixed-motives has 
proven discrimination.68  Underlying the 1991 Civil Rights Act was a 
recognition that whenever an improper criterion is a motivating 
factor in an employment decision, Title VII’s statutory prohibition is 
contravened.  As amended, Title VII now provides that proof that the 
employer would have made the same decision notwithstanding the 
improper motive, under the mixed-motive test, may be introduced by 
the defendant, but the effect of prevailing is merely to limit the 
obligation to pay compensatory damages and backpay.69  A plaintiff 
who establishes that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was 
a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
66 Id. at 244-245.  Of some significance to the argument pursued here, in affirming the 
propriety of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, Justice O’Connor invoked 
earlier jury selection cases as precedent.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 268 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) 
(“once the consideration of race in the decisional process had been established, we held 
that ‘the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional 
action by showing that permissible racially netural selection criteria and procedures have 
produced the monochromatic result’”). 
67
 490 U.S. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Believing that but-for causation was an 
essential element of proof of a violation, the dissent went even further and argued that the 
plaintiff, rather than the defendant, should carry the burden in a mixed-motive case on 
that issue. Id. at 286 (arguing that plaintiff should retain burden of proof, as under 
conventional Burdine-type case).
68 See P.L. 102-166, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat 1071.  For a discussion of the 1991 
Amendments, see Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate 
Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 584-588 (1996).
69 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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factors also motivated the practice,” may be awarded declaratory 
relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs.70  With respect 
to the liability determination, Title VII now operates under a per se
rule, and the statutory scheme thus expressly acknowledges that a 
plaintiff’s proof that an employer’s improper purpose was a 
“motivating factor” in an adverse employment action against her is 
sufficient to establish a violation. 
C. Mixed motive in Batson cases
Batson was decided in 1986, nine years after Mt. Healthy and 
Arlington Heights. It was only a matter of time, and a short time at 
that, before the mixed-motive problem emerged in the Batson
context.  Batson employed a three-step framework to resolve 
allegations regarding the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges in jury selection.  That framework provides that, at step 
one, a party challenging a strike has the burden to make out a prima 
facie case that the strike was exercised for a discriminatory 
purpose.71  Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the 
burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a neutral explanation for 
striking the juror.72  If the prosecutor meets that minimal burden, the 
analysis then proceeds to a third step, in which the court must 
decide, in light of the totality of the facts and evidence, whether the 
70 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
71 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that defendant can make out a prima facie case “by 
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose”) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-242 (1976)); Miller-El v. 
Cockrell,  537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (same). At this stage, the defendant need not prove 
discriminatory intent but only point to facts consistent with such illicit intent as to fairly 
put the issue into play.  Evidence relevant to support a prima facie case includes the fact 
that the strike was used against a member of a protected class, the pattern of strikes 
exercised by the challenged party, and any other evidence that might support an inference 
of discrimination.  Once the defendant makes a “prima facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race, . . . the prosecution must offer a race-
neutral basis for striking the juror in question.”  Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 
2416 (2005).
72 476 U.S., at 94, (once defendant establishes prima facie case, “burden shifts to the 
State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral 
justifications for the strikes.); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003) (explaining 
that at step two, “the prosecution must offer a … neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question”).  
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neutral reason proffered by the challenged party was pretextual and 
the challenged strike a product of discrimination.73
The framework shares many features with several earlier jury 
selection cases that also employed a burden-shifting framework.74  In 
Neal v. Delaware,75 for example, the Court found that the fact that no 
black jurors had been ever been summoned to serve as a juror in the 
State “presented a prima facie case of denial” of equal protection 
rights, and the State’s response – that there was not a single black 
juror in all the state who possessed the qualifications to serve as a 
juror, was a “violent presumption” unworthy of credence.  Once a 
prima facie case is established, it was recognized, “[t]he burden falls 
to the State to refute it.”76  The Court’s jury selection cases have 
adhered to this basic analytical structure, holding that statistical or 
circumstantial evidence that blacks were being systematically 
excluded from jury service constituted “prima facie proof” of a 
constitutional violation, and sufficient evidence of a non-
discriminatory purpose must be adduced by the government to rebut 
the prima facie case.77 Batson’s three-step framework extends and 
elaborates upon this procedural structure and marks a continuity 
rather than a break in approach. 
The mixed-motive problem, of course, arises in Batson when 
the proponent of a challenged strike, at step-two, proffers an 
explanation that includes both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  
Trial courts facing a mixed-motive explanation have responded in 
three different ways.  Some have held that when a discriminatory 
reason is included among the reasons proffered by the prosecutor to 
justify a strike, the prosecutor has failed to satisfy his step two 
73
 Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at 2324; Johnson, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005) 
(explaining that if the prosecution tenders a neutral explanation, then the issue is properly 
joined, and the trial court must proceed to the third step of the inquiry and decide 
“whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination” ) 
(quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 767)
74 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-96 & nn. 18-19 (citing McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, as 
well as Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 
(1972)). 
75
 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881).
76
 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 233 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper v. 
Mississippi, 251 Miss. 699, 707 (1965)).
77 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 480.  
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burden.78  These courts have reasoned that Batson’s framework 
commands that the proponent of a strike come forward with a neutral 
explanation, and that any explanation that includes race or gender 
simply fails that standard. Under that reasoning, the proper response 
to a mixed-motive explanation is to terminate the inquiry and sustain 
the objection.79  Other courts have acknowledged the mixed nature of 
the explanation, but because not all of the articulated reasons were 
improper, have nonetheless proceeded to step three to conduct a 
conventional Batson pretext analysis.80  Finally, a third group of 
courts have refused to find that an admission of discriminatory 
animus constitutes a per se Batson violation.  Instead, they have 
invoked “mixed motive” or “dual-motivation” analysis, either at the 
second step or at the third, to determine whether the strike violates 
the Equal Protection Clause.81
78 See, e.g., McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1112-13 (Ind. 2004); State v. Lucas, 
199 Ariz. 366, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (2001) (holding that dual motivation analysis in the 
Batson context is “inconsistent with the ‘facially valid’ standard announced by the 
Supreme Court in Purkett”); Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 
(S.C.1998) (expressly rejecting “dual motivation” analysis and holding that articulation 
of one racially-motivated reason requires invalidation); Rector v. State, 213 Ga.App. 450, 
444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga.App.1994) (same); Wisconsin v. King, 215 Wis.2d 295, 572 
N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis.Ct.App.1997) (“[W]here the challenged party admits reliance on a 
prohibited discriminatory characteristic, we do not see how a response that other factors 
were also used is sufficient rebuttal under the second prong of Batson.”). cf. Robinson v. 
United States,  878 A.2d 1273, 1284 (D.C.,2005) (holding that “even if the prosecutor 
acted from mixed motives, some of which were non-discriminatory, his actions deny 
equal protection and violate Batson if race or gender influenced his decision. A 
peremptory challenge may not be based even partially on an unlawful discriminatory 
reason;” but refusing to decide whether “same decision” defense is available to 
prosecutor).
79 See, e.g., Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1998) (holding that 
regardless of how many other nondiscrimiantory factors are considered, any 
consideration of a discriminatory factor directly conflicts with Batson’s purposes and 
taints entire jury selection process).
80 See, e.g., Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F.Supp.2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding, on habeas 
review, that state court decision “that the second step of the Batson analysis can be met 
by articulating both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a strike is not contrary to or 
an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent”) (aff’d, Kesser 
v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing en banc granted,425 F.3d 1230 (9th 
Cir.2005)); Kesser v. Cambra, 2001 WL 1352607 (N.D.Cal. Oct 26, 2001) (aff’d, Kesser 
v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing en banc granted,425 F.3d 1230 (9th 
Cir.2005)). 
81 See cases cited supra nn. 111-116.
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The early court decisions that grappled with the mixed-
motives problem generally concluded that a mixed-motive 
explanation did not satisfy Batson’s step two requirement to proffer 
a “neutral explanation” for a strike. The Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals was the first court to expressly confront it, at least in a 
published decision.82  In Owens v. State,83 the prosecutor, after 
having used fifteen of his 23 strikes against blacks, initially 
explained with respect to one of the jurors that the primary reason 
for striking the juror was “age and single status.”84  When pressed for 
additional reasons by the trial judge, however, he admitted that the 
fact that the juror “was the same race as the defendant was a 
factor.”85 Based on this admission, the Court concluded that the 
prosecutor had not come forward with the neutral explanation 
required by step two of the Batson framework, and held that the trial 
court’s finding to the contrary was “clearly erroneous.”86 In reaching 
this conclusion, the court described the problem as one of “mixed 
motive,” but did not directly address the Supreme Court’s mixed 
motive cases or the framework suggested in those cases to resolve 
the Batson problem. 
Shortly after the Alabama Criminal Court decided the Owens 
case, two justices of the United States Supreme Court also rejected 
the use of mixed motive analysis in the Batson context.87  In 
Wilkerson v. Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had 
refused to find a Batson violation despite the prosecutor’s admission 
that “race was a factor” in his peremptory strike of an African-
American juror, where race was merely “[o]ne of many 
considerations,” and “nothing major.”88  In a dissent to a denial of a 
petition for certiorari joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall 
82
 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unpublished decision, also apparently 
invoked mixed motive analysis to uphold a conviction in the face of a Batson challenge 
around the same time. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case.  See Wilkerson v. 
Texas, 493 U.S. 924 (1989).
83
 531 So.2d 22, 26 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987)  (“We fail, at this juncture, to see how any 
explanation can meet the four articulated requirements if it is based, in part, on race.…”)
84 Id. at 24.
85 Id. at 24.
86 Id. at 26.
87 See Wilkerson v. Texas (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
88 Id.
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argued that a mixed motive explanation “cannot be squared with 
Batson’s unqualified requirement that the state offer ‘a neutral 
explanation’” for its peremptory challenges.89  In Justice Marshall’s 
view, a neutral explanation can only be understood as one based 
“wholly on nonracial criteria.”90  Adaptation of the mixed motive 
defense in the Batson context, in Justice Marshall’s view, is also 
inappropriate “because of the special difficulties of proof” that 
would arise.91
At the same time, other Texas courts interpreted Batson to 
require strict neutrality.92  As early as 1987, an intermediate appellate 
court in Texas concluded that although a prosecutor might articulate 
one or more race-neutral reasons along with a non-neutral reason for 
striking a minority juror, “a prosecutor's admission that race was an 
influencing factor in the selection process vitiates the legitimacy of 
the entire procedure.”93  In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed 
that approach and declared that any consideration of an improper 
criterion in jury selection violates equal protection.94    Several state 
courts, including Indiana,95 Arizona,96 Georgia,97 South Carolina,98
and Wisconsin,99 have endorsed this “taint approach” and held that 
the inclusion of a discriminatory reason in an explanation, 
89 Id. at 926.
90 Id. at 926.
91 Id. at 926.
92
 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not followed the State Supreme Court’s lead, 
and has rejected the taint approach in favor of mixed-motive analysis.  See Guzman v. 
State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). For a discussion of the battle 
among Texas’s courts over the mixed motive issue, see Ross P. Brooks, Mixed Messages: 
Texas' Two Highest Courts Deliver Conflicting Opinions Regarding The Fourteenth 
Amendment Mixed Motive Doctrine As Applied In The Context Of Batson/Edmonson 
Juror Exclusion Hearings, 6 SCHOLAR 311 (2004); Geoffrey A. Gannaway, Texas 
Independence: The Lone Star State Serves as an Example to Other Jurisdictions as it 
Rejects Mixed-Motive Defenses to Batson Challenges, 21 REV. LITIG. 375 (2002) 
(reviewing Texas law prior to the en banc decision in Guzman).
93 Speaker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987); 
McKinney v. State,761 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988) (quoting 
Speaker, 740 S.W.2d at 489).
94 See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1991).
95
 McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108 (2004).
96
 Arizona v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).  
97
 Rector v. Georgia, 213 Ga. App. 450, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1994).
98
 South Carolina v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805, 811 (2001).
99
 Wisconsin v. King, 215 Wis.2d 295, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
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“regardless of how many other nondiscriminatory factors” are also 
proffered, “taints the entire jury selection process.”100
This early momentum came to an abrupt halt, however, with 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Senkowski.101  For better 
or worse, the Howard case has proved tremendously influential in 
shaping the debate over mixed motive.  The facts in Howard are 
similar to those in Owens and Wilkerson.  Howard was tried in a 
New York state court for various charges, including robbery, in 
1984, prior to the Batson decision.  During jury selection, defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor used peremptory 
strikes to remove the only two black jurors from the venire.  The 
motion was denied and Howard was convicted by an all-white jury.  
While his appeal was pending, Batson was decided.  Finding that a 
prima facie case of discrimination was established, the state 
appellate court remanded Howard’s case for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine the reasons for the strikes.102
At the hearing, the prosecutor candidly admitted that race was 
a factor in his decision to strike the black jurors.  He contended, 
however, that “race had not been an ‘overriding’ or a ‘major’ 
factor,”103 and stated that he also took into account several neutral 
factors, including that one of the jurors seemed to lack a sufficient 
education, and the other juror had limited work experience, 
expressed no views on an important issue in the case, had no 
connection to law enforcement, and because of her five children, 
might be sympathetic to the defendant.104  Applying the three-step 
pretext analysis from the Title VII case Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine,105 the state courts concluded that 
Howard failed to establish purposeful discrimination.106  Although 
100
 Arizona v. Lucas, 199 Ariz. 366, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).  The theory 
was developed in several intermediate Texas appellate court opinions.  See Moore v. 
Texas, 811 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex.Ct.App. 1991) (holding that “[e]ven though the 
prosecutor may have given one racially neutral explanation, the racially motivated 
explanation "vitiates the legitimacy of the entire [jury selection] procedure"). 
101
 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).
102 Id.
103
 986 F.2d at 25.
104 Id. at 25.
105
 450 U.S. 248, 248 (1981)
106 Id. at 26.
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the Second Circuit found the state court’s analysis too forgiving, it 
also declined to endorse the taint approach to mixed motive cases.  
On the one hand, it reasoned, the state applied the wrong legal 
standard because the question in such a case is not about pretext; it is 
not “the all-or-nothing question of whether or not an impermissible 
consideration motivated the challenged action.”107  Because the 
challenger has satisfied his burden to prove improper motivation, 
Burdine’s three-step framework is moot.  On the other hand, the 
court declined to observe a per se rule. Invoking Mt. Healthy and 
Arlington Heights, the court held that “[o]nce the claimant has 
proven improper motivation, dual motivation analysis is available to 
the person accused of discrimination to avoid liability by showing 
that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the 
improper motivation that the claimant has proven.”108   Accordingly, 
the Second Circuit held, “Howard was entitled to prevail unless, 
under dual motivation analysis, the prosecutor could sustain his
burden of showing that he would have exercised his challenges 
solely for race-neutral reasons”109 and remanded the case for analysis 
under that standard. 110
The approach endorsed by the Second Circuit in Howard111
has subsequently been adopted by several other federal circuit courts 
of appeals, including the Third,112 Fourth,113 Eighth,114 Ninth,115 and 
Eleventh.116  Although the current trend unmistakably favors an 
embrace of mixed motive analysis, an equal number of federal 
107 Id.
108 Id. at 27.
109 Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
110 Id. at 30.
111
 The Second Circuit affirmed Howard in two subsequent cases. See U.S. v. Brown, 352 
F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1996).
112 Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 2002)
113 Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995)
114 U.S. v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995); Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024 
(8th Cir. 2001);
115
 Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004) (opinion vacated and en banc 
rehearing held).
116 King v. Moore (11th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Tokars (11th Cir. 1996); Wallace v. Morrison 
(11th Cir. 1996).  Although the Seventh Circuit has not yet adopted mixed motive 
analysis, Judge Cudahy opined that it should in a concurring opinion. See Holder v. 
Welborn, 60 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 1995).
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circuit courts, numerous state courts,117 and the Supreme Court itself 
have all yet to address its permissibility.118  In this Article, I argue 
that the turn to mixed motive in the Batson context is a mistake that 
threatens to undermine whatever safeguards Batson provides against 
discriminatory jury selection.  As I argue below, a different approach 
is necessary to safeguard the minimal gains achieved in Batson’s 
two-decade reign.   
II. BATSON, NEUTRALITY, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
More than 100 years before Batson was decided, the Supreme 
Court declared that the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of jurors 
on account of race,119 and in case after case, the Court has reaffirmed 
that principle.120  Thus, jurors may not be excluded from jury service 
because of an illicit criteria.  But what does the slippery term 
“because of” mean in the peremptory strike context, in which 
traditionally jurors can be excluded “for any reason, or no reason”?121
What if a juror was struck because of neutral and improper 
criteria?122  Can such an explanation be considered “neutral”?  Does 
117 See, e.g., People v. Schmeck, 37 Cal.4th 240, 276, 118 P.3d 451, 476 (2005) (noting 
that California state courts have not resolved “whether a mixed-motive peremptory 
challenge could constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights”).
118
 In addition, some of those that have affirmed, under the highly deferential habeas 
review standards mandated by 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), a state’s use of mixed motive, have 
either implicitly or expressly reserved any judgment regarding whether Batson is best 
read to permit mixed motive, should the issue arise on direct review.  See, e.g., Gattis v. 
Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 225 (holding that “state courts’ application of ‘dual motivation’ 
analysis to Gattis’ Batson challenge did not result in a decision that was ‘contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, Federal law”).
119
 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880).
120 See, e.g., Strauder v. W. Virgina, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte State of Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339 (1879), Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 
442 (1900); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 
(1935); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 n.1 (1965) (collecting cases); Batson, 476 U.S. at 
84 n.3 (collecting cases).
121
 U. S. ex rel. Darcy v. Handy  351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956) (noting that peremptory 
challenges give each party “discretion to exclude jurors deemed objectionable for any 
reason or no reason.”).  For a historical overview of the evolution of jury selection 
challenges, see William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1406-1416 (2001) (tracing history beginning with English 
law from 1100s and early 1200s through contemptory American practice).
122
 As a review of the mixed motive cases indicates, the mixed motive problem has arisen 
where prosecutors have admitted that race or sex was a “factor,” or where they struck a 
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the fact that at least one of the reasons proffered by the proponent of 
the strike suffice to satisfy the step two burden?  As will be 
discussed below, fundamental equal protection principles preclude 
that conclusion.  
juror because they “preferred” a jury with a different racial or gender composition, or 
where they feared that a common racial or sex characteristic between the juror and the 
defendant might create bias.  In Howard v. Senkowski, for instance, the prosecutor 
admitted that race was “a factor” in the decision to strike, because he believed it “made 
them sympathetic to the defendant,” but alleged that other factors, including the 
prospective jurors’ education and intelligence, limited work experience, and five 
children, were more important considerations. 986 F.2d at 25. In Gattis v. Snyder, the 
prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against an elderly African-American male.  
The prosecutor there gave two reasons for the strike, one of which was based on gender.  
First, the prosecutor pointed to what he considered to be “very conservative” views 
regarding “application of the death penalty.”278 F.3d at 232. Second, he stated that the 
juror was “an older gentleman,” and noting the presence of several other older gentlemen 
on the jury panel, stated that “we would prefer to have some more women on the jury.” 
Id. at 232. In United States v. Darden, the prosecutor gave two reasons for striking a 
female African-American juror. First, he stated his belief that “young black females … 
tend … to be more sympathetic toward individuals who are involved in narcotics.”  70 
F.3d at 1530-1531. He also stated that he struck the juror because she “said virtually 
nothing” during the voir dire and thus he believed her to be “either naïve or withholding 
information,” or to have “virtually no experience with the criminal justice system.” 70 
F.3d at 1530-1531.  In Weaver v. Bowersox, the prosecutor stated that he struck an 
African-American female juror “for a number of reasons,” including her hesitation in 
answering questions about the death penalty and lack of eye contact. He also added that, 
“in any event, I was not persuaded that she could give the death penalty, particularly to a 
fellow black person,” and observed that she was “cutting up and talking to the black 
gentleman next to her.”  241 F.3d at 1027.  In King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th
Cir. 1999), the prosecutor proffered the following explanation for striking an African-
American female: “Okay. She is a young black female[;], the Defendant is a young black 
male. Her response to the Court’s inquiry with regard to her feelings aobut the death 
penalty we felt were sufficient for us to have concern about how she would apply the 
law.”  In Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 1996), the prosecutor was 
asked by the trial judge if he “consider[ed] race in striking these ones that you struck, the 
black ones you struck?” The prosecutor responded by explaining that he used a rating 
system to assign numbers to prospective jurors, and added  “[r]ace was a factor that I 
considered just as I considered age, just as I considered their place of employment and so 
on.”  In Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004), the prosecutor exercised 
peremptory strikes against all three native Americans on the venire. When called to 
explain his strike of the first juror, he stated that “[m]y experience is that native 
Americans who are employed by the tribe are a little more prone to associate themselves 
with the culture and beliefs of the tribe than they are with the mainstream system,” and 
“they are sometimes resistive” and “suspicious” of the criminal justice system. He also 
gave several additional, neutral reasons for striking the juror, including that she seemed 
to him to be pretentious, emotional, from a dysfunctional family, and “fairly weak.”
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A. The Meaning of “Neutrality” at Batson’s Step Two
In Hernandez v. New York, the Court made clear that the 
question at step two is narrow: an explanation is “neutral” as long as 
there is no literal admission of purposeful discrimination.  A strike 
may be exercised for reasons that closely correlate with race, as long 
as the reason is not itself race, and a strong conceptual linkage 
between the reason and the race or ethnicity of the juror is not 
enough.  A step two explanation is legally “neutral,” according to 
Hernandez, “unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
prosecutor's explanation.”123  Because the explanation offered by the 
prosecutor did not literally turn on the race or ethnicity of the 
bilingual jurors, the proffered explanation satisfied the neutrality 
requirement.
The Court revisited the step-two inquiry four years later in 
Purkett v. Elem,124 where two black men were struck purportedly 
because of their beards and goatees.125  In reversing the Eighth 
Circuit’s finding that the prosecutor had failed to adduce a reason 
that satisfied Batson’s second step, the Court underscored that the 
burden at step two was purely one of production, not persuasion.  
Elem interpreted the step-two burden as setting forth what is in effect 
a pleading standard rather than an evidentiary standard.  To satisfy 
its burden of production, the proponent of a strike need not proffer 
an explanation that is credible to survive scrutiny, and at step two, 
the trial court should not be concerned with whether the tendered 
explanation is “persuasive, or even plausible.”126 That evaluation 
takes place at step three.127  In construing step two in this manner, the 
Court did no more than follow its Title VII jurisprudence, where it 
already had declared that, at step two of the comparable McDonnell-
Douglas/Burdine framework, a Title VII “defendant need not 
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the [proffered] 
123 Id.
124
 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
125
 514 U.S. at 766.
126 Id. at 768.
127
 The Supreme Court recently reiterated that proposition in Johnson v. California, 125 
S. Ct. 2510 (2005) (noting that “even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly 
nonsensical justification for its strike, the case does not end—it merely proceeds to step 
three”).
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reasons.”128  After Elem, courts are not authorized to terminate a 
Batson inquiry as long as the prosecutor provides a facially-neutral 
explanation. But Hernandez and Elem did not eliminate step two 
altogether, nor as some commentators argue, did they necessarily kill 
Batson.129
The Court in Elem was quick to point out that although 
facially-neutral explanations satisfy the step two burden, 
“implausible or fantastic explanations may (and probably will) be 
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”130 Elem, in other 
words, defers scrutiny rather than prohibits it.  Such a reading is 
consistent with Batson’s obvious intent to create practically 
enforceable evidentiary rules.  After all, Batson was handed down 
largely in recognition that the Swain regime131 had failed effectively 
128
 Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248 (1981).  In McDonnell 
Douglas, the Court devised a set forth a three-step burden-shifting framework to help 
lower courts resolve the evidentiary inquiry mandated by Title VII.  The purpose of this 
procedural mechanism was to determine whether the plaintiff has established that the 
adverse employment action was taken “because of” a discriminatory purpose.  See Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003).  Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff 
“must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination.”  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the complainant succeeds in 
establishing a prima facie case, the “burden then must shift to the employer to articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id.  Finally, if 
the employer comes forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the Court must 
determine whether the complainant can show that the employer’s stated reason for 
rejection “was in fact pretext.”  Id. at 804.  This framework was affirmed again in 
Burdine. 450 U.S. 248.  As a matter of logic, a finding that the proffered explanation was 
pretextual does not necessitate a conclusion that the challenged action was the product of 
discrimination.  It is entirely possible that the defendant will articulate a false explanation 
for a challenged action to hide a permissible (although embarrassing or irrational) 
purpose rather than an impermissible one.  Acknowledging this possibility, the Supreme 
Court held in concluded in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993), 
that the plaintiff in a Title VII case bears a greater burden than merely proving pretext; 
she must also prove that the pretextual explanation masked a discriminatory purpose. 
Explaining that its Title VII “decisions concerning ‘disparate treatment’” have “explained 
the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, Batson
adapted the formal structure of Title VII to the jury-selection context.
129 See, e.g., Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical 
Tragedies in the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 372 
(1998) (asserting that “[t]he Elem opinion in many ways renders useless the ten years of 
Batson jury selection jurisprudence”).
130
 514 U.S. 765, 768.
131 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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to stop the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and its 
authors no doubt intended courts to apply its requirements to provide 
effective enforcement of the non-discrimination principle.132
Although Elem bars any searching credibility determinations at step 
two with respect to the plausibility of the explanation offered, Elem
does not disturb the conditional nature of the Batson framework, 
which has always required the state to carry its burden of production 
before the inquiry may properly proceed to step three.133  Although a 
neutral explanation remains legally sufficient even if it is “silly or 
superstitious,”134 it must nonetheless be free of any inherent 
discriminatory intent,135 that is, the proponent of a challenged strike 
still must come forward with an explanation for the strike that does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.136 Elem’s 
creation of a strict pleading standard heightens the importance of the 
criteria used to assess the legal neutrality of a proffered explanation.  
Ultimately, whether or not an explanation proffered at step two is 
sufficient depends on the governing equal protection standards.  It is 
to those standards we now turn. 
B. Neutrality and Equal Protection
Modern equal protection law is grounded in the requirement, 
established in Washington v. Davis,137 that an equal protection 
132 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93 (noting that decision to overturn Swain was necessary 
because the Swain’s requirement that challengers adduce proof of repeated striking of 
blacks over many cases had erected a “crippling burden of proof” that rendered 
“prosecutors’ peremptory challenges … largely immune from constitutional scrutiny”).
133
 514 U.S. at 767 (explaining that “if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial 
court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved 
purposeful racial discrimination”) (emphasis added).
134 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
135 Id. at 768, citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(neutral explanation is one “based on something other than the race of the juror”); id. at 
374 (O’Connor, J., concurring opinion) (“Batson’s requirement of a race-neutral 
explanation means an explanation other than race.”)
136 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (“At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the 
facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.”). Cf. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (explaining 
that in Title VII case, a defendant only carries his burden of production at step two if 
“[t]he explanation provided … [is] legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the 
defendant.”)
137
 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  The Davis decision has been described by commentators as “the 
most important equal protection case of the last quarter-century.”  See Ian F. Haney 
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violation can not be established absent proof of purposeful 
discrimination.138  Arguably the most important equal protection 
decision of its time, Davis definitively established that disparate 
impact evidence alone is insufficient to establish an equal protection 
violation.139  But government decisions, whether made by a group or 
an individual, are often made for multiple reasons.  If a government 
action does not violate the equal protection clause unless it can be 
tied to a discriminatory purpose, how important must that purpose 
be? Must it be the sole, or dominant, aim or purpose?140
Relying largely on tort standards,141 Arlington Heights
supplied an answer, clarifying that Davis’s requirement that 
disparate impact be linked to a discriminatory purpose does not 
mean that the discriminatory purpose must be the “sole” motivation 
for the challenged action before a violation will be found.  A long 
line of precedents utilized language that suggested that 
discrimination only occurs where the sole purpose of the actor was 
Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1832 (2000); K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domain of 
Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 525, 538 (2001).
138
 In Swain itself, the Court had emphasized this point.  See 380 U.S. at 205 (noting that 
“purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted. It must be proven.”) 
(internal cites omitted).
139
 In Davis, a group of unsuccessful black applicants to the District of Columbia police 
department alleged that a qualifying test administered to applicants disproportionately 
disqualified blacks and therefore ran afoul of equal protection.  The Court rejected the 
claim.  Id. at 240 (basic equal protection principles require “that the invidious quality of a 
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially 
discriminatory purpose”).
140 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (arguing against judicial review of 
legislative motives in part because it is  “difficult or impossible for any court to 
determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of 
legislators”).  The Supreme Court’s equal protection cases reflect a longstanding attempt 
to cabin the reach of the clause by targeting only state action that is intended “solely” to 
disadvantage minorities.  
141
 The rule established in Washington v. Davis itself, that precludes an equal protection 
violation from prevailing absent evidence of “invidious intent,” might itself be 
understood as based on common law tort principles.  See Pillai, supra note 142, at 530 
(“It may be argued plausibly that the Davis rule reflects the venerable common law 
tradition of not subjecting a party to liability without establishing causation and 
culpability,” thereby operating in a manner analogous to “rules of criminal law or tort 
litigation.”).  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 & n.7 (noting that the words in Title 
VII “‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of,” and that Congress had expressly 
rejected an amendment to the statute that would have accomplished precisely that).
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invidious.142  But the Equal Protection Clause does not require such a 
strong showing.  As the Court explained, “[r]arely can it be said that 
a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate 
made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a 
particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”143  The 
reasoning mirrors language from the Second Restatement of Torts, 
which states that “[i]t is not necessary that it be the cause, using the 
word ‘the’ as meaning the sole and even the predominant cause.”144
If the discriminatory purpose need not be the “sole” or 
predominant purpose, then to what extent must the discriminatory 
purpose factor in the decision?  The Court’s answer again tracked 
general causation principles borrowed from the law of tort.  
According to the Restatement, an actor’s conduct is a legal cause of 
harm to another where that conduct is a “substantial factor in 
142 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (explaining that it is a 
violation of the equal protection clause to compel “a colored man to submit to a trial for 
his life by a jury drawn from the panel from which the State has expressly excluded every 
man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects”); 
(Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) holding that “[w]henever by any action of a 
state, whether through its Legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or 
administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of 
their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of 
the African race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary to the 
Fourteenth Amendment”); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (quoting Carter); 
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (same); Swain, 380 U.S. at 830 (denying that 
“purposeful discrimination based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing that 
an identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%”) (emphasis 
added)
143
 429 U.S. at 265.
144
 REST 2d TORTS § 430 (d) (“In order that a negligent actor may be liable for harm 
resulting to another from his conduct, it is only necessary that it be a legal cause of the 
harm. It is not necessary that it be the cause, using the word "the" as meaning the sole and 
even the predominant cause. The wrongful conduct of a number of third persons may also 
be a cause of the harm, so that such third persons may be liable for it, concurrently with 
the actor.”).  See also Jeremiah Smith, supra note 28, at 311 (explaining that causal 
liability should be sufficient upon a showing that tortious conduct was a substantial factor 
in causing the harm, it need not be “the sole factor, nor the predominant factor”).  The 
Court has invoked this principle repeatedly in its anti-discrimination jurisprudence, 
reiterating that “[d]iscrimination need not be the sole cause in order for liability to arise, 
but merely a necessary element of the set of factors that caused the decision.”  Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 1808 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
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bringing about the harm.”145  A “substantial factor” is one which 
would lead “reasonable men to regard it as a cause” of the plaintiff’s 
harm.146  Professor Brest similarly had argued that the proper test in 
cases in which an unconstitutional motive is alleged requires the 
complainant to “establish by clear and convincing evidence that such 
an objective played an affirmative role in the decisionmaking
process,” but agreed that he need not “establish that consideration of 
the objective was the sole, or dominant” cause of the decision.147
The Arlington Heights Court adopted a comparable standard, 
but perhaps because the issue is not, strictly speaking, causation but 
purpose, adopted the term “motivating” in lieu of the Restatement’s 
“substantial” and Brest’s “affirmative,”148 but with no indication that 
the motivating factor test differed materially from the substantial 
factor test.149  Although generally “courts refrain from reviewing the 
merits” of legislative decisions “absent a showing of arbitrariness or 
irrationality, … [w]hen there is proof that a discriminatory purpose 
has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference 
is no longer justified.”150  Proof of discriminatory purpose, according 
to Arlington Heights, is established upon a showing that an 
“invidious discriminatory purpose” was “a motivating factor” for the 
decision – the plaintiff need not prove that such purpose was the sole 
motivating factor, nor even that such purpose had “primacy.”151
145
 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 431(a), at 428 (1965).
146 Id. at Comment (a) to § 431(a), at 429.
147
 Brest, supra note 38, at 130-131.
148
 In Mt. Healthy, the court used the terms interchangeably.  See 429 U.S. 274, 285.  See 
also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 238 n.2 (1989) (noting that lower courts had 
employed a variety of tests, including “motivating,” “substantial,” and “discernible” 
factor tests); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Mt. Healthy language using both 
terms as synonyms).
149 See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of 
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 503-510 (2006) (noting that 
various opinions in Price Waterhouse used the terms interchangeably, and that there is no 
logical distinction between terms).  
150 Id. at 265-266.
151 Id. at 265 n.11. See also Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d at 29 (concluding that the 
use of the word “solely” in the Batson opinion should not be read as an indication that a 
defendant carried a higher burden of proof in the peremptory challenge context than he 
did in any other context in which proof of purposeful discrimination is necessary to 
prevail on a claim brought under the equal protection clause). Cf. Brest, supra note 38, at 
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These principles were further explicated in Personnel 
Administrator of Massachussetts v. Feeney,152 a case involving an 
equal protection challenge to a Massachussetts’ law that accorded a 
civil service hiring preference to veterans.  On its face, the veterans 
preference was gender-neutral; female veterans were equally entitled 
to the preference.153  However, because the vast majority of veterans 
are male, the preference clearly had a disparate impact on female job 
applicants.154  Conceding that the disparate impact of the preference 
was readily apparent to lawmakers, the Court, again consistent with 
general tort principles, rejected a standard that would equate 
knowledge of disparate impact with purpose to discriminate.  Under 
general tort principles, it often is “held not to be sufficient that the 
actor knew that his conduct was substantially certain to produce the 
injury, and it may be necessary that he desired to bring it about.”155
Likewise, the Feeney court acknowledged that given the 
foreseeability of the disparate impact on women from the veterans 
preference, “[I]t would … be disingenuous to say that the adverse 
consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the 
sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not 
foreseeable.”156  But discriminatory purpose implies “more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.  It implies 
that the decisionmaker … selected or reaffirmed a particular course 
of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”157  Because Feeney could 
not demonstrate that the Massachussetts’ preference was the product, 
even in part, of a discriminatory purpose, her claim failed.158
Although the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights and Feeney both 
failed to prove that legislative or administrative classifications were 
intentionally designed to effect a discriminatory purpose, these cases 
have been regularly invoked by the Court for the proposition that the 
119 n.123 (arguing that rule motivated by legitimate and illegitimate objectives “should 
be invalidated if the illict objective played any material role in the decision”).
152
 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
153 Id. at 268.
154 Id. at 271.
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (i).
156 Id. at 278.
157 Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
158 Id. at 280.
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plaintiff’s proof of discriminatory purpose under Washington v. 
Davis does not require the plaintiff to prove that a discriminatory 
purpose was the sole or predominant factor in the decision.159 The 
relevant question is not whether the challenged action was taken in 
part, even in large part, for legitimate motives, but instead whether 
the decision was motivated, even in part, by an improper purpose; 
that is, whether an invidious discriminatory purpose was “a 
motivating factor” in the decision.160
These principles clarify the question of what constitutes an 
improper purpose for a peremptory strike, and the Supreme Court 
has in fact invoked them for that purpose in its Batson jurisprudence.  
In Hernandez, for instance, the Court cited both Washington v. 
Davis’s injunction that proof of disparate impact is not enough to 
establish an equal protection violation and Feeney’s teaching that the 
showing necessary to establish a violation is that the course of action 
was at least in part chosen because of the invidious purpose.161  More 
recently, in the first of the two Miller-El decisions, the Court 
explicitly stated that an objecting party will satisfy his burden under 
Batson by demonstrating that race was “a motivating factor” for the 
exercise of a peremptory strike.162 Miller-El quite clearly did not 
159 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio  490 U.S. 642, 672-673 (1989) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is elementary that a plaintiff cannot recover upon proof of 
injury alone; rather, the plaintiff must connect the injury to an act of the defendant in 
order to establish prima facie that the defendant is liable. E.g., Restatement § 430. 
Although the causal link must have substance, the act  need not constitute the sole or 
primary cause of the harm. §§ 431-433; cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,490 U.S. 228, 
(1989)”); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 272 (1993) (holding 
that civil rights statute providing cause of action for deprivation of equal protection, as 
applied to anti-abortion protesters, requires proof that invidious purpose “at least in part” 
motivated their action in preventing women from obtaining abortions at clinic).
160
 Although the general equal protection causation test only requires evidence that the 
illicit motive was “a motivating factor,” the Court has not followed this reasoning in its 
redistricting cases.  In those cases, the Court has required a showing that race was “the 
predominant factor” that led to a particular outcome.  See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 916 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996).  
161 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256 (1979) (emphasis added).  
162
 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003) (“Even though the practice of jury 
shuffling might not be denominated as a Batson claim because it does not involve a 
peremptory challenge, the use of the practice here tends to erode the credibility of the 
prosecution's assertion that race was not a motivating factor in the jury selection.”); id. at 
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demand any proof that the strikes exercised at Miller-El’s trial have 
been solely or predominantly the product of invidious intent.  In 
addition, the lower courts that have sanctioned mixed-motive 
analysis have also acknowledged that these principles define 
neutrality.  Chief among them, the Second Circuit in Howard v. 
Senkowski acknowledged that a discriminatory purpose is 
established by proof that such a purpose is even a “part of a 
motivation,”163 and rejected the proposition that Batson must be read 
to require proof that the improper purpose was the “sole motivation” 
for the peremptory strike.164
Given that the burden of proving discriminatory purpose is 
satisfied upon a showing that an illicit factor was even a partial 
consideration by the actor, the contention is foreclosed that a mixed-
motive explanation – one that admits that a discriminatory purpose 
was part of the motivation for exclusion of the juror – can be deemed 
facially valid.165
C. Mixed-Motive Explanations Are Not Neutral 
Like Justice Marshall, the state courts that have adopted the 
“taint approach” to the mixed-motive problem have recognized that 
any approach to a mixed-motive explanation that “does not prohibit 
a prosecutor from striking a juror even when the decision is based in 
part” on an improper reason “cannot be squared with Batson’s 
unqualified requirement that the state offer ‘a neutral explanation’ 
for its peremptory challenge.”166  A mixed-motive explanation is not 
a neutral explanation under the applicable equal protection standards 
347 (“The supposition that race was a factor could be reinforced by the fact that the 
prosecutors marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror cards.”).
163
 986 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1993).
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (concurring 
opinion)  (arguing that “No "neutral explanation" can serve to rebut the presumption that 
the condemned practice of exclusion based on race occurred when the prosecutor admits 
that such an exclusion did occur. . . .”) (quoting McKinney, 761 S.W.2d at 551);
166
 Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 926 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.) (emphasis in original).
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because the prosecutor has in effect admitted that an improper 
purpose was “a motivating factor” in her decision to strike a juror.167
The conclusion that a mixed-motive explanation is not neutral 
is strengthened by consideration of the nature of the step two 
inquiry.  As the Court has strongly underscored, step two does not 
involve, or even allow, any credibility assessment.168  The strict 
injunction on factual assessment at step two virtually eliminates a
court’s discretion to disregard a discriminatory admission. Just as a 
court may not dismiss a facially neutral justification as 
“implausible,” neither may it pick and choose which among several 
proffered reasons to believe, nor choose to credit one articulated 
reason but disregard another. To do so would require it prematurely 
to weigh the evidence and make precisely those credibility 
assessments that the Supreme Court has unambiguously stated are 
not appropriate at step two.  Instead, the court must assume “that the 
proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are [all] true,” and 
only then determine if “the challenges violate the Equal Protection 
Clause as a matter of law.”169
As noted above, the raison d’etre of the Batson framework is 
to answer the question whether the conduct that has a disparate 
impact (in this case, the peremptory strike) can be traced to a 
discriminatory purpose.  An explanation that includes an 
impermissible motive as one of several motives evinces that the 
peremptory strike was exercised “at least in part” for a 
discriminatory purpose.”170  Such a reason is not neutral – that is, it is 
facially inconsistent with equal protection.171
167 See Owens v. State, 531 Slo.2d 22, 26 (concluding that given Batson’s requirements 
that a neutral explanation be neutral, related to the case to be tried, clear and reasonably 
specific, and legitimate, that it could not “see how any explanation can meet the four 
articulated requirements if it is based, in part, on race”).  Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 926 
(Marhall, J. dissenting from denial of cert.) (“To be “neutral,” the explanation must be 
based wholly on nonracial criteria.”) (emphasis in original).
168 See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. 2418 n.7; Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (holding that Court
of Appeals erred by combining Batson’s second and third steps into one”).
169 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359.
170
 That conclusion does not follow only if the improper motive was not actually a 
“motivating factor” at all in the actual decision. Given the context, that conclusion seems 
implausible. After all, when asked to explain why she struck a juror, a prosecutor’s 
answer that she did so, in part because of race, is strong evidence that she viewed race as 
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Given that a mixed-motive explanation necessarily fails the 
step-two neutrality requirement, what is the appropriate response 
when such an explanation is proffered?  If a “mixed-motive” 
explanation is not neutral under the Batson framework, should the 
inquiry come to an end?  If not, is it necessary, or even permissible, 
to move on to step three notwithstanding that the proponent of the 
strike has failed to carry her burden?    
D. Conventional Pretext Analysis in Mixed Motive Cases
Proceeding to step three in a mixed-motive Batson case, as 
some courts have,172 is an error because Batson’s framework was 
designed to elucidate whether a discriminatory purpose was a 
motivating factor in the decision to exercise peremptory strikes.  
Whether the explanation provided by the prosecutor to justify the 
strike was truthful or “pretextual,” as Batson’s third step is designed
to elucidate, is simply not the relevant inquiry in a mixed-motive 
case.  First, it renders superfluous the conditional nature of the 
Batson framework, which only directs courts to undertake a factual 
assessment if the prosecutor carries her step two burden of 
production.  If that conditional requirement were ignored, then there 
would be no burden at all at step two, which would amount to a 
wholesale rewriting of Batson.  
Second, moving to step three propels the court toward the 
wrong inquiry.  In a conventional Batson case, the issue at step three 
having some bearing on her conduct.  That is, she herself seems implicitly to be 
acknowledging that race was at least one of several causal factors in her decision. 
Presumably, if race really was superfluous to her decision, she would not have felt 
compelled to include it in her explanation.
171 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (concurring 
opinion) (stating that “equal protection is denied whenever race is a factor in the exercise 
of a peremptory challenge. This "bright line" rule is necessary because one simply cannot 
articulate a "race-neutral" explanation for exercising a peremptory strike when race is a 
part of that explanation. But see id., 827 S.W.2d at 869 (plurality opinion) (rejecting 
“bright-line” rule urged by concurring opinion in favor of mixed-motive approach).
172 See, e.g., Leahy v. Farmon, 177 F.Supp.2d 985 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding, on habeas 
review, that state court decision “that the second step of the Batson analysis can be met 
by articulating both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a strike is not contrary to or 
an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent”) (aff’d, Kesser 
v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 2004); rehearing en banc granted,425 F.3d 1230 (9th 
Cir.2005)); People v. Howard, 128 A.D.2d 804, 513 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 
1987).
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is whether the neutral explanation offered by the prosecutor is 
“true.”  If it is, then the strike was not the product of a 
discriminatory purpose.  The party objecting to the strike carries the 
burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the neutral 
explanation was not true, that is, was a pretext for an illicit 
purpose.173
Pretext cases and mixed-motive cases thus involve quite 
distinct legal issues.  In a typical pretext case – for which the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework was devised – the factual 
issue to be resolved at step three is whether the facially neutral 
reasons articulated by the defendant at step two were the “real” 
reasons for the adverse employment decision, or whether they are 
more likely than not a “pretext” for the “true” discriminatory 
reason.174  That is not the case once an illicit motive has been 
admitted or proved.  As the plurality in Price Waterhouse explained, 
“[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate motives … it simply makes no sense to ask whether the 
legitimate reason was ‘the true reason’ for the decision—which is 
the question asked by Burdine.”175  After all, it very well may be true 
in a mixed motive case (indeed, it is presupposed) that the legitimate 
reasons played a part in the employer’s decision.  At most, what is at 
issue is whether the employer still would have made the decision in 
the absence of the illegitimate consideration. 
The dispositive issue in a mixed-motive case is not whether 
or not the actor harbored a discriminatory purpose, per Washington 
v. Davis, but whether that purpose had a causal effect.  The 
truthfulness of any other, neutral justifications asserted by the actor 
is still relevant; after all, if those reasons prove to be pretextual (that 
is, they were invented to cover up for the “true” illegitimate purpose) 
then there is no possible doubt that the impermissible reason 
173
 As the Howard court itself recognized, the central question in a pretext case is whether 
the facially neutral explanation proffered by the challenged party was the “real” reason 
for the exercise of the strike, or rather was merely a pretext for the illicit, discriminatory, 
purpose.  See 986 F.2d at 27.
174 See, e.g., Robert W. Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment 
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 1359, 1383-84 (1990).
175 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion).
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“caused” the adverse action.  But proof that the legitimate reasons 
were not pretextual does not resolve the causation question, it merely 
complicates it.
Because mixed-motive cases are conceptually distinct from 
pretext cases, where the proponent of a challenged strike proffers a 
mixed-motive explanation, it is error to proceed to a conventional 
pretext analysis.  Those who have argued that anything but 
adherence to the conventional Burdine framework is contrary to the 
well-established principle that the plaintiff carries the ultimate 
burden to prove purposeful discrimination,176 have misunderstood 
that a plaintiff who has established mixed motives has already 
carried that burden.  As Justice O’Connor noted in Price 
Waterhouse, once a plaintiff has established this much, she has 
“taken her proof as far as it could go.”177
The question, then, is not whether a mixed-motive 
explanation should be subjected to standard pretext analysis, but 
whether the mixed-motive principles used in other contexts should 
be invoked to give the prosecutor an opportunity to save a 
peremptory strike notwithstanding her failure to carry her burden at 
step two.  In affirming the applicability of mixed-motive analysis, 
the Second Circuit in Howard wholly failed to consider whether a 
showing that an improper purpose was a motivating factor for a 
strike was sufficient to terminate the Batson inquiry, or whether the 
use of mixed motive in the Batson context was consistent with 
Batson’s underlying purposes.  If, as Howard recognized, it would 
be error to conduct a conventional pretext analysis,178 as will be 
demonstrated below, it is equally erroneous to turn to mixed motive 
to resolve the causation question.  
III. MIXED MOTIVE UNDERMINES BATSON
In Howard, the Second Circuit found it appropriate to use 
mixed-motive analysis because it concluded that such analysis had 
176 See Price Waterhouse, (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
178
 986 F.2d at 27 (noting once the claimaint has proven improper motivation, there is no 
further need for “pretext” analysis). 
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been implicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Citing Mt. Healthy
and Arlington Heights, it contended that:
In the realm of constitutional law, whenever 
challenged action would be unlawful if improperly 
motivated, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
the challenged action is invalid if motivated in part by 
an impermissible reason but that the alleged offender 
is entitled to the defense that it would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the improper motive.179
If the Second Circuit’s sweeping assertion that a single 
standard has been utilized in all constitutional cases in which 
motivation is an issue were true, then the Second Circuit’s resort to 
mixed-motive in Howard might be more defensible.  But a single 
standard has never been uniformly employed.  In the redistricting 
context, for example, a plaintiff must prove not only that race was a 
“substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the legislature’s choice 
of a district’s contours, but that it was the “predominant” factor.180
That is, not only was it the “but-for” cause of the particular lines 
drawn by the legislature, but that other neutral concerns were 
“subordinated” to achieve the challenged outcome.181  Thus, in Bush 
v. Vera, a redistricting case that the Court acknowleded involved 
“mixed motives” – the districts challenged in Vera were drawn to 
produce “minority-majority” districts and to protect incumbents –
the plaintiffs’ proof that race influenced the shape of the district was 
held to be insufficient to require strict scrutiny.182  Instead, the 
179 Id. at 26.
180
 Miller v. Johnson  515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff's burden is to show, either 
through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct 
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating 
the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a 
particular district.”) 
181 Id. (“To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated 
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations.”)
182
 Bush v. Vera  517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (“The appellants concede that one of Texas' 
goals in creating the three districts at issue was to produce majority-minority districts, but 
they also cite evidence that other goals, particularly incumbency protection (including 
protection of “functional incumbents,” i.e., sitting members of the Texas Legislature who 
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plaintiffs were obligated to prove that race was the “predominant” 
motive.  In dissent, Justice Thomas observed that the court’s test was 
substantially stricter than the “but-for” causation standard employed 
in other contexts.183  But the unique considerations, both of proof and 
purpose, in the redistricting context have long been thought to justify 
a different standard. 
Choice of a particular threshold standard for application of 
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause, therefore, depends 
on the context and purpose in which that standard is utilized.184
Whether the same-decision test found appropriate in other 
constitutional tort and legislative motive cases should be transferred 
to Batson depends on whether that causation standard is appropriate 
to the Batson context and furthers its purposes.  Certainly, if a 
chosen threshold standard conflicts with or undermines the basic 
goals in an area of law, as the Court’s redistricting jurisprudence 
demonstrates, the chosen standard rather than the goals should give 
way.  As the Article demonstrates below, mixed-motive analysis 
undermines Batson’s expressive function, undercuts its practical 
effectiveness, and requires the trial court to engage in counterfactual 
speculation for which it is wholly ill-equipped.  For all these reasons, 
mixed-motive analysis should not be permitted in the Batson
context.  
A. Symbolism, Deterrence and Diversity
Batson was intended to “put an end to governmental 
discrimination on account of race,”185 and advances that goal in three 
ways: it symbolizes official intolerance of discrimination in jury 
selection, it seeks to deter such discrimination, and it provides 
had declared an intention to run for open congressional seats), also played a role in the 
drawing of the district lines.”). 
183 Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority that creation of 
minority-majority districts does not necessarily require strict scrutiny; doing so “means 
that the legislature affirmatively undertakes to create a majority-minority district that 
would not have existed but for the express use of racial classifications-in other words, 
that a majority-minority district is created “because of,” and not merely “in spite of,” 
racial demographics”) (emphasis added).
184 See id., at 1951 (noting that “[u]r precedents have used a variety of formulations to 
describe the threshold for the application of strict scrutiny.”)
185
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
MIXED MOTIVES 44
marginal incentives not to strike minority jurors and thus should, in 
theory, enhance jury diversity.  Of these functions, Batson probably 
has served the first most successfully.  As a rhetorical device, Batson
and its progeny have sent a strong message to the criminal justice 
system that discrimination in jury selection cannot and will not be 
tolerated.186  Indeed, the Court has stated that nowhere is the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s command to eliminate official racial 
discrimination more compelling than in the judicial system, and 
Batson was crafted specifically to achieve that goal.187 The 
constitutional command to root out discrimination is so overriding 
that the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the exclusion of 
even a single juror on account of his or her race, ethnicity, or gender 
calls it into force.188
Batson serves the function not only of preventing actual 
discrimination, but also of abolishing perceived discrimination and 
combatting “cynicism” and a loss of “public confidence” in the 
criminal justice system.189  Mixed-motive analysis undermines this 
symbolic function by tolerating actual discrimination in jury 
186 See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, 
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1813 (1993) (arguing that the Court
has taken Batson seriously because it “acts as a lightning rod for all of the Court’s 
unexpressed concerns about racism in the criminal justice system”); The Supreme Court, 
1991 Term; Leading Cases; I. Constitutional Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 244 
(asserting that “the Court's extension of Batson to a criminal defendant's exercise of 
peremptory challenges stands as a powerful condemnation of race-based judgments in the 
courtroom”).  Some, however, have argued that Batson’s symbolic message is far 
outweighed by its practical failure to restrain discrimination.  See Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Batson
line of cases as having merely "great symbolic value" as a demonstration of the court's 
"uncompromising hostility to race-based judgments.”)  
187 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 415. 
188 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (noting that “‘a single invidiously discriminatory governmental 
act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the makign of other 
comparable decisions’”); Walker v. Girdich, 410 F.3d 120, 2005 WL 1349916, at *3 (2d 
Cir. June 8, 2005) (stating that “under Batson and its progeny, striking even a single juror 
for a discriminatory purpose is unconstitutional”).  Precisely the same “zero tolerance” 
approach has been recognized to underlie statutory anti-discrimination provisions.  See, 
e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (noting 
that the objectives of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “are furthered when 
even a single employee establishes that an employer has discriminated against him or 
her.”).
189 Id.
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selection, and as such, is inconsistent with the injunction that "racial 
discrimination has no place in the courtroom.”190  Permitting the 
exclusion of a juror after the prosecutor has admitted a 
discriminatory purpose in striking her cannot but contribute to a 
belief by a convicted defendant that her conviction was the product 
of discrimination.191  Similarly, jurors themselves so excluded are 
unlikely to comprehend the subtle distinction between a 
discriminatory purpose and a causative factor.  Jurors who surmise 
the reasons for their exclusion, therefore, undoubtedly will be no less 
offended that the prosecutor harbored a discriminatory bias against 
them simply because the prosecutor also identified a separate 
subjective basis for their exclusion. Likewise, this subtle distinction 
is sure to be lost on the general public that learns that blacks, or 
women, or other minority members, were excluded from jury service 
notwithstanding the prosecutor’s admission that she harbored a 
distrust, or dislike, of persons of their group.192
Allowing the mixed-motive defense also sends precisely the 
wrong message to prosecutors and judges, who learn that some 
invidious intent is tolerable, and that they may even be relatively 
candid in admitting or tolerating a discriminatory purpose.  
Toleration of intentional misconduct is inconsistent with Batson’s 
basic premises, and undercuts its hortatory potential to exert a 
positive influence on the conduct of public officials.193
Like Title VII, Batson’s prohibition on discrimination was 
crafted to provide a “spur or catalyst” to cause trial lawyers to “self-
evaluate” their jury-selection practices “and to endeavor to 
190 Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
191 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) (“Active discrimination by a prosecutor 
during this process condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very 
institution entrusted with its enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury's 
neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.”)
192
 Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at 2324 (explaining that “the very integrity of the 
courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor’s discirmination ‘invites cynicism respecting the 
jury’s neutrality,’ and undermines public confidence in adjudication”).
193 See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2023 (1998) (noting that “the Batson rule is to a great extent 
hortatory” and courts’ acceptance of dubious Batson explanations “may send a message 
to prosecutors and defense counsel that the exclusion of minority jruors is generally not 
going to be taken very seriously”).
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eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges” of their discriminatory 
tactics.194  In insisting that there be a but-for causal nexus before any 
relief is provided, the mixed-motive test works against the goal of 
deterrence. The mixed-motive defense permits a prosecutor who has 
relied on improper criteria to prevail simply because the prosecutor 
was able to demonstrate that there may have been other non-
discriminatory factors that would have led to the “same decision.”  
As the Court has noted in the statutory discrimination context, the 
identification of discriminatory acts through litigation provides an 
important tool by which to attack subterreanean discriminatory 
practices and beliefs that may pervade the wider contextual 
culture.195  Given that the instance of discrimination targeted in a 
particular case is likely reflective of the prosecutor’s general 
attitudes and biases, and the likelihood that these same biases will 
influence the decisions made by that attorney in future trials, 
permitting the proponent of the strike to evade sanction by 
persuading the court that the discriminatory motive was not the “but-
for” cause of the strike against that individual juror increases the 
chances that either that attorney, or other attorneys, will discriminate 
against other jurors in the future.196 The end product is a vastly 
underprotective regulatory regime.   
Batson also serves a diversity-enhancing function.  The 
exclusion of minority jurors on account of group characteristics 
“compromis[es] the representative quality of the jury.”197  In holding 
that the free exercise of peremptory challenges must give way to the 
194
 Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A 
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 318 (1982) (quoting Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418 (1975)).
195 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-359 (1995)
(explaining that enforcement of age discrimination claims is important even absent 
showing of but-for causation as to damages, because “[t]he disclosure through litigation 
of incidents or practices that violate national policies respecting nondiscrimination in the 
work force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of 
noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation of the Act's operation or entrenched 
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance”).
196 See Katz, supra note 156, at 519 (explaining that “[s]ocial scientists would predict 
that, if undeterred, an employer’s minimually causal utilization of protected 
characteristics in one decision will increase the likelihood of future utilization by that 
employer, as well as future utilization by other employers”).
197
 476 U.S. at 87 n.8.
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antidiscrimination principle, Batson signalled that the traditionally 
unfettered common law/statutory right to peremptory challenges is 
subordinate to equal protection’s constitutional command.  By 
prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes, Batson demanded, in 
essence, that certain otherwise rational generalizations be ignored or 
disabled to serve the larger goal of ensuring minority representation 
in the criminal justice system.  Batson thus created what some have 
described as a “special rule of relevance”198 that functions as a kind 
of “affirmative action” for the purpose of overcoming entrenched 
racial discrimination.199  Under Batson, minorities receive special 
protection against arbitrary removal from the venire.  Everything 
else being equal, prosecutors have an incentive to strike non-
minority jurors rather than minority jurors simply to avoid the 
chance that the defendant might prevail on a Batson motion.200
Batson thus contributes at the margins to expand minority 
participation in the criminal justice system.  Both in preventing 
discrimination in jury-selection, and in affirmatively discouraging 
the exclusion of minority jurors, Batson furthers the goal of 
enhancing the diversity of juries.  
Mixed-motive analysis, however, diminishes the ability of 
courts to reinforce the representational quality of juries.  Indeed, the 
use of mixed-motive analysis may represent a conscious judicial 
design to diminish the affirmative-action effects of the Batson rule.201
In crafting burden-shifting and causation rules under Title VII, the 
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that these rules were 
intended to countermand “the risk that employers will be given 
198 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing Batson as 
establishing “‘a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for, 
rather than a statement of fact’”) (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941-
942, 107 S.Ct. 423, 424-425, 93 L.Ed.2d 373 (1986) (opinion concurring in denial of 
certiorari).
199
 Nesson, supra note __, at 8.
200
 Title VII created precisely the same dynamic. See Belton, supra note __, at 1379 
(discussing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) & Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989)).
201 See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment 
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 1359, 1364 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions dealing with 
causation and burden-shifting doctrines were the product of the conservative majority’s 
“fundamental objection to affirmative action in any form”).
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incentives to adopt quotas or to engage in preferential treatment.”202
As with other forms of affirmative action, the application of mixed-
motive principles to Batson would have the effect of neutralizing, at 
least in part, its progressive purposes.  
Whatever the ideological motivation behind its adoption, 
practically speaking, mixed motive analysis has tended to insulate 
discriminatory jury selection tactics from reversal.  Although every 
Circuit that has permitted mixed motive analysis in Batson cases has 
also recognized the necessity of shifting the burden of proof to the 
proponent of the challenged strike, and has acknowledged that the 
legal issue in the mixed-motive analysis is but-for causation, several 
courts have applied the but-for analysis in a sloppy or superficial 
manner to avoid reversing convictions, demonstrating the ease with 
which the mixed-motive test lends itself to the deconstruction of 
Batson’s already skimpy armament.203  In addition, cases remanded 
for the purpose of conducting a mixed-motive analysis have 
typically resulted in affirmance, suggesting that the mixed-motive 
framework performs little more than a rubber-stamping function.204
202
 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
203 See, e.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming state court’s denial 
of Batson motion where prosecutor proffered mixed-motive explanation and state court 
did not apply the burden-shifting framework specified in Mt. Healthy, based on its 
“interpretation” of the trial court’s findings as implicitly satisfying the standard); Wallace 
v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1996) (making implicit findings that state court had 
made necessary factual findings under correct legal standard, notwithstanding that state 
court did not in fact apply correct burden-shifting framework).  At least one court has 
further placed the burden on the defendant not only to raise the initial Batson objection, 
but also specifically to argue for the application of the mixed-motive standard in order to 
preserve the claim on appeal.  This reasoning appears inconsistent with the status of the 
mixed-motive defense as an “affirmative defense,” which normally when not raised by 
the party that is entitled to the defense are deemed waived.  See State v. Hodge  248 
Conn. 207, 226, 726 A.2d 531, 544 (Conn., 1999) (declining to consider dual motivation 
claim on appeal where defendant asserted in trial court only that “the reasons articulated 
by the state's attorney compelled the conclusion that the state’s attorney had engaged in 
purposeful discrimination” and the “trial court expressly found that the reasons given by 
the state's attorney for striking the six minority venirepersons were not pretextual”).
204
 The number of cases in which a court on remand finds that the challenged party 
carries its burden to prove that it would have made the “same decision” vastly 
outnumbers the cases in which the challenging party prevails.  See, e.g., Doyle v. Mt. 
Healthy Bd. of Ed., 670 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1979) (affirming finding that Board would have 
dismissed Doyle even had it not considered his exercise of protected speech rights); 
People v. Howard, 158 Misc.2d 739, 601 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y.Co.Ct. Jul 28, 1993) 
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In short, a jury selection process that tolerates discriminatory 
bias in any form does not clearly and unmistakably communicate the 
message that such discrimination is unacceptable, nor is it likely to 
serve the function of deterring discrimination effectively.  Although 
as a formal matter, the mixed-motive test is designed to identify 
instances in which the discriminatory purpose did not matter (in the 
sense that it did not affect the ultimate result), the message mixed 
motive sends to the larger community is likely that racism and 
sexism just “don’t matter.” 
B. Easing the “Crippling Burden of Proof”
Not only does mixed-motive analysis undercut Batson’s 
expressive functions and deterrent goals, it erects new evidentiary 
hurdles.  Batson’s framework was developed specifically to address 
the “practical difficulties of proving that the State systematically has 
exercised peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on 
account of race.”205  As the Court explained, Swain’s requirement 
that proof of abuse of the peremptory challenge over a number of 
cases was necessary to establish a constitutional violation “placed on 
defendants a crippling burden of proof.”206  As a result, under Swain, 
a prosecutor’s peremptory challenges remained “largely immune 
from constitutional scrutiny.”207 Batson directed courts to abandon 
the focus on the systematic practices of the prosecutor and permits a 
finding of an equal protection violation based on the prosecutor’s 
conduct in the instant case alone.  
Notwithstanding this focus on efficacy, Batson has been 
severely, and rightfully, criticized for failing to erect an adequate 
(finding on remand that prosecutor would have made “same decision” to strike juror 
notwithstanding admission that “race was a factor”). But see Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 737 F.Supp. 1202 (1990) (affirming judgment for Hopkins under mixed-
motive standard ) (aff’d, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (1990)).
205
 476 U.S. at 93 n.17.  476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. at 
2426 (noting that Batson was decided in wake of recognition that “Swain’s demand to 
make out a continuity of discrimination over time … [was] difficult to the point of 
unworkable”).
206
 476 U.S. at 92.
207
 476 U.S. at 92-93.
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barrier against purposeful discrimination.208  After all, to sustain her 
burden of production at step two, the proponent of a strike need not 
articulate a good reason, but only one that is not itself facially 
discriminatory.209  As Justice Marshall observed in his Batson
concurrence, “any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral 
reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to 
second-guess those reasons.”210 The relative ease with which a party 
intent on discriminating can conjure up a neutral explanation for a 
strike helps explain why so few Batson challenges succeed.211
Mixed-motive analysis further undermines Batson’s objective of 
easing the evidentiary burden of proving discrimination.  
1. Lack of Evidence
Batson challenges occur in a virtual evidentiary vacuum --
there is extremely little evidence available even in a full-blown 
Batson hearing that sheds much real light on the question of whether 
an explanation is credible.  But the evidentiary problems are greatly 
compounded if a Court, allowing the mixed-motive defense, must 
also decide whether an improper purpose was the but-for cause of 
the prosecutor’s decision to strike the juror.  Aside from the 
circumstantial evidence adduced by the objecting party as the prima 
facie case, the primary evidence, and sometimes the only evidence, 
will be the prosecutor’s own explanation for her conduct – the 
objective validity of which is open to obvious attack.  As one judge 
observed, “no prosecutor worth his salt is going to come right out” 
and admit an intent to discriminate.212  It is invariably difficult for 
208 See Developments in the Law – Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1472, 1581 (1988) (noting that under Batson, “the prosecutor can easily articulate a non-
race based reason for her peremptory challenges - and often a reason that is difficult for 
trial judges to assess.").
209 See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)
210
 476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Indeed, as one commentator more bluntly 
put it, “[i]f prosecutors exist who have read Hernandez and cannot create a ‘racially 
neutral’ reason for discriminating on the basis of race, bar examinations are too easy.”  
Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory 
Challaneges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 59 (1993).
211 See Melilli, supra note __, at 460 (discussing low success rate of Batson claims in 
reported cases from 1986 to 1993 and surmising that low success rate may be because “it 
is too easy for the responding party to offer neutral explanations”).
212
 Kesser v. Cambra, 392 F.3d 327, 344 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
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courts to confidently conclude that an attorney’s neutral explanation, 
even when the circumstantial evidence suggests otherwise, is a flat-
out lie.  Such a finding extends beyond a mere procedural ruling and 
implicates the attorney in ethical misconduct.213  Given the 
acknowledged difficulty of identifying outright prevarication, at 
minimum, Batson should be construed to provide vigilant and 
unyielding protection at least in those few instances where racial or 
gender bias is overt.
In a constitutional tort case or an employment discrimination 
action, indeed, in any case in which the conduct of an organization, 
legislature, or administrative body is challenged, the multiplicity of 
actors and the availability of an often extensive record produced 
through document discovery and depositions creates the possibility 
that evidence of racial bias can be disentangled from the causal
sources of an adverse action.  In Title VII cases, “the liberal 
discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court,” which 
are supplemented “by the plaintiff’s access to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s investigatory files concerning her 
complaint,” improve the chances that a plaintiff can meet her 
evidentiary burden.214  But such evidence is wholly unavailable in the 
context of Batson challenges.  Unlike routine civil cases, Batson
disputes “have no pretrial phase: no pleading, no discovery, no 
pretrial memoranda,” and “present none of the usual methods for 
‘smoking out’ evidence and narrowing disputed issues.”215
The primary evidence available to answer the question at 
issue under mixed-motive analysis – whether the “same decision” 
would have ensued notwithstanding the improper motive – is the 
prosecutor’s own statements. A Batson hearing is not, however, 
psychotherapy; attorneys are advocates with partisan objectives.  An 
attorney’s statements thus must be evaluated in light of their self-
serving nature, suggesting that the admission of an improper motive, 
as an inculpatory admission, is much more significant than the 
213 See Charlow, supra note __; Anderson, supra note __ (noting that Batson objections 
involve challenges to the integrity of lawyers).
214
 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
215 Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 2229, 2303 n.239 (1995)
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articulation of purportedly neutral reasons.  As Justice O’Connor 
pointed out in Price Waterhouse, direct evidence of discrimination 
has great persuasive force.216  Although attorneys can be expected to 
attempt to justify their strikes by stating neutral reasons, an 
admission by a prosecutor that race or gender was a motivating 
factor is “direct evidence” of a discriminatory motive.  Indeed, in a 
Title VII case the defendant may not rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case “merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of 
counsel.”217  Instead, the defendant must produce evidence that 
supports his profferred explanation.218  In a Batson dispute, the 
“defendant” and “counsel” are one and the same, and Batson does 
not obligate the production of any evidence other than the 
“articulation” of counsel.  In obliterating the distinction in roles, 
Batson is at odds with the mixed-motive framework.  Mixed motive 
analysis in such a context builds a virtual castle of purported factual 
inquiry out of nothing but self-serving conjurations.219 As Justice 
Marshall argued, “[a] judicial inquiry designed to safeguard a 
216 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that 
mixed-motive test burden-shifting should occur only upon introduction of direct evidence 
of an improper motive); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90, 91 (2003) (holding that Title VII, as 
amended, does not require “direct evidence” to prove mixed motive).  See also Brest, 
supra note 38, at 124 (noting that admissions by the decisionmaker are “the most reliable 
evidence of his actual objectives,” especially given “the ease with which one can lie 
successfully about one’s motives”).
217
 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.9.
218 Id. (“An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice” to rebut the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case.)
219
 Again, comparison with Title VII cases is instructive.  Under Title VII, and unlike the 
equal protection context, a plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating that an employment
practice has a disparate impact on a minority group.  In Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court held that a plaintiff could not, however, establish 
a prima facie case based on statistical evidence of disparate impact alone.  Rather, the 
plaintiff must also demonstrate that “the disparity they complain of” was caused by a 
specific, challenged, employment practice.  In explaining why this proof of causation 
requirement should not be unduly burdensome on plaintiffs, the Court reasoned that 
“liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers’ records in an 
effort to document their claims,” as well as administrative regulations that require 
employers to maintain records detailing the impact of its “selection procedures” on 
employment opportunities of minority group members.  Id. at 657-658.  Obviously, 
persons raising a Batson objection to a peremptory strike lack access to any such 
information, and strike proponents are under no comparable regulatory regime to
document their exercise of strikes.
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criminal defendant’s basic constititutional rights should not rest on 
the unverifiable assertions of a prosecutor who, having admitted to 
racial bias, subsequently attempts to reconstruct what his thought 
process would have been had he not entertained such bias.”220
It also is important to acknowledge the context in which the 
dispute is played out.221  In a Batson dispute, a minority juror is 
struck by the prosecutor under circumstances giving rise to “an 
inference” of discrimination.222  The prosecutor is called to explain 
the basis for the strike – that is, the alleged wrongdoer is asked the 
question, point blank, immediately upon taking the apparently 
improper action – “why did you strike this juror?”  An answer that 
includes illicit criteria seems an implicit concession that the illicit 
purpose not only existed but played a causal role as well.
The question “why” did you strike this juror is linguistically 
interchangeable with “for what cause” did you strike this juror or 
“what caused you” to strike this juror. The prosecutor’s act of 
identifying an improper motive itself is proof that the articulated 
reason was a “cause” of the strike.223  A mixed-motive case is that 
rare exception where the prosecutor candidly, or stupidly, confesses 
a discriminatory impulse.  Where there is a “smoking gun,” 
permitting the strike is a direct affront to basic equal protection 
values.224  As one court embracing the taint approach has stated, “[t]o 
220 Id. at 927-928.
221
 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger,  J., dissenting) (“unadulterated equal protection analysis ius 
simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised in any particular case”).
222 See Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005) (explaining that step one of Batson
only requires evidence giving rise to inference of discrimination).
223
 That separation between cause and motive may be more defensible in other contexts 
involving groups or corporate bodies, as is typically the case in employment 
discrimination or constitutional tort actions.  For instance, although an employee’s 
supervisor may have been motivated to recommend termination of the employee by racial 
animus, the corporation may be able to demonstrate that the employee would have been 
fired anyway as a result of a race-neutral plan to lay off workers.  Similarly, some 
members of a legislative or administrative body may be motivated to take action based on 
a discriminatory animus, but a majority may be shown to have pursued the course of 
action for other, legitimate and race-neutral, reasons.  In these cases, the identification of 
an illicit motive might be conceptually severable from a causal account of the conduct 
that rendered the illicit motive superfluous to the outcome.
224
 Although the Second Circuit expressed concern that permitting mixed motive might 
encourage prosecutors to falsely deny that they were influenced by improper views, see 
Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that “[t]he cynical might 
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excuse such obvious prejudice because the challenged party can also 
articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory strike would 
erode what little protection Batson provides against discrimination in 
jury selection.”225
2. Unconscious Discrimination
Not only is the foundation for this inquiry inherently 
untrustworthy, there is reason to doubt the capacity of even the most 
honest and fully candid attorney to acknowledge, or even 
understand, the subconcious or instinctive motivations that prompt 
the exercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of relatively 
intangible criteria.226  The necessary finding in a case in which the 
prosecutor carries his burden under the mixed-motive test – that the 
admitted discriminatory bias did not ultimately influence the 
decision to strike the juror – presumes that the court can confidently 
conclude that the admitted bias was a relatively minor factor.  But 
the presumption that the discrimination was minimal may be based 
on the false perception that what exists is what can be perceived –
like thinking that the iceberg consists solely of what can be viewed 
above the waterline, when the vast bulk lies unobserved below.
Even presuming that lawyers are entirely honest and open 
about their motivations for striking jurors, there are powerful reasons 
to believe that much discrimination occurs at the subconscious level.  
Lawyers undoubtedly form negative impressions about potential 
jurors based on a wide array of factors, only some of which may be 
articulable by the lawyer.  Often, the factors that trigger these 
negative assessments may be illicit criteria such as race, ethnicity, or 
gender.  A well-intentioned lawyer may not only be unaware that her 
discomfort with a particular juror is racially-based, but would 
sincerely deny the allegation.  Indeed, believing herself part of the 
“liberal” and “tolerant” class, she might be deeply offended by the 
suggest that prosecutors will take from our ruling [permitting mixed motive analysis] a 
message of caution not to acknowledge that race was a factor in their use of peremptory 
challenges even in those instances when it was”), permitting the mixed motive defense in 
fact frees prosecutors to retain their biases rather than work to overcome them.  
225
 Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1998).
226 See Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping And The 
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).
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suggestion.  To explain her impressions, she might lie even to 
herself.227  She would likely identify some other nominally neutral 
trait or character on which to pin her unease: it was not his race, but 
his age, occupation, education, or general demeanor.  He was 
“sullen” or “distant.”228  It was the way he answered questions, his 
tone of voice, his facial expression, his “lack of connection” with 
her, his lack of investment in the community, the cut of his hair, his 
bodyweight, his television viewing habits, etc.229 The list is 
potentially endless. 
The problem, as Justice Marshall observed, is that 
“prosecutors’ peremptories are based on their ‘seat-of-the-pants 
instincts,” and such instincts may be nothing more than “racial 
prejudice.230  “Even if all parties approach the Court’s mandate with 
the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to 
confront and overcome their own racism on all levels.”231  There is 
depressingly little evidence that much progress has been made 
toward overcoming subconscious racial bias, and little reason to 
hope that it will be anytime soon.
Allowing the prosecutor to preserve a peremptory strike after 
she has admitted a discriminatory purpose, based on a belief that the 
other “neutral” reasons articulated would have led to the “same 
decision,” therefore, is to ignore the very real possibility that those 
neutral reasons are the product of the same discriminatory animus 
already confessed.232  Mixed motive merely establishes a convenient 
227 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that attorney may even lie to 
themselves to convince themselves that their motives are legal) (citing King v. County of 
Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493, 501-502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
228
 476 U.S. at 106.
229
 For a discussion of the problem of inadvertent bias, especially in the workplace, see 
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) (discussing 
unconscious bias – the inadvertent application of nominally neutral criteria in a 
systematically biased fashion).
230 Id.
231
 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J. concurring) (adding that overcoming unconcious racism 
was “a challenge I doubt all of them can meet”).
232 See Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note __, at 49 (arguing that “[I]f facial and gender 
stereotyping are pervasive, it is not at all clear that one should assume sufficient 
independent ‘legitimate’ employer motivation,” and that “because racist and sexist 
thoughts are so deeply imbedded in our’cultural belief system,’ the idea that one can 
distinguish among such motives … reflects a ‘false dichotomy’”) (quoting Lawrence, The 
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fiction by which courts, and lawyers, can pretend that one’s 
improper views can somehow be walled off, segregated, and 
neutralized. 
3. Incentivizing Obfuscation
The availability of the mixed-motive defense also creates 
strong incentives for prosecutors to give long, elaborate, and 
convoluted explanations for their strikes.  A prosecutor who realizes 
that she has made a damaging admission can quickly move to rectify 
that slip by adding several additional justifications for the strike.  
Indeed, prosecutors might find it advisable as a matter of strategy to 
provide long-winded explanations of their strikes in every Batson
case.  If they do, then every future Batson case will at the least also 
be a mixed-motive case.
Encouraging lengthy and disjointed explanations, however, is 
flatly inconsistent with Batson.  In describing the state’s burden, 
Batson emphasized that an adequate step two showing requires more 
than a mere pro forma denial of discriminatory intent, an affirmation 
of good faith, or an assertion that the prosecutor assumed partiality 
because of the jurors race.233  “If these general assertions were 
accepted as rebutting a defendant’s prima facie case, the Equal 
Protection Clause ‘would be but a vain and illusory requirement.’”234
As the Court explained in the comparable Title VII context, the 
burden of production at step two serves a critical litigative function 
by “fram[ing] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317, 322 (1987)).
233 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.  In Johnson v. California, moreover, the Court reaffirmed 
the necessity that the strike’s proponent come forward with an explanation, 
notwithstanding that Batson’s framework does not demand that a prima facie case 
establish that discriminatory intent more likely than not motivated the strike.  The reason 
that the prima facie case can be satisfied by raising a mere inference of discrimination, 
the Court explained, was that the prosecutor’s failure to adduce an explanation for the 
strike at step two would be powerful confirmation that the inference of discrimination 
was correct.  See 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2418 n.6 (2005).
234
 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. at 598).
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plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate 
pretext.”235
An adequate explanation, the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized, must therefore possess two characteristics: it must be a 
“‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of [the] ‘legitimate 
reasons’” for exercising the strike, and it must be “related to the 
particular case to be tried.”236  Explanations that lack these 
characteristics fail the basic purpose of burden allocation, which is 
“progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual 
question of intentional discrimination.”237  Like summary denials of 
discriminatory intent, long, multi-faceted and disjointed explanations 
do anything but sharpen the inquiry, are not clear and reasonably 
specific,238 and thus significantly detract from Batson’s purposes.    
4. Counterfactual speculation
Finally, the counterfactual nature of the mixed-motive inquiry 
poses another daunting obstacle to any meaningful resolution of the 
causation question.239  Determining whether one motive was a but-for 
cause of a choice is notably more difficult than resolving the 
question of whether a given explanation is credible.  Under a 
235 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-256. The Court also explained that the step two burden 
“serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate 
reason for the [challenged] action.”  Id.
236 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20.  See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (explaining that 
limiting the step two burden to one of production rather than persuasion does not “unduly 
hinder” the plaintiff for several reasons, because the defendant still must adduce an 
“explanation of its legitimate reasons … [that is] clear and reasonably specific” in order 
to afford the plaintiff “‘a full and fair opportunity’ to demonstrate pretext”).  The Court 
recently reaffirmed these requirements, and noted that to be adequate, an explanation 
must have “some basis in accepted trial strategy.”  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 
339 (2003).
237
 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.8.
238
 Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (2005) (“Although there may be "any 
number of bases on which a prosecutor reasonably [might] believe that it is desirable to 
strike a juror who is not excusable for cause ..., the prosecutor must give a clear and 
reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e].") 
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20).
239
 Assessments of causation are highly intertwined with counterfactual reasoning, and 
are subject to change based on changing counterfactual assumptions.  See Barbara A. 
Spellman and Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual “But For” 
and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 
LAW & CONTEMPT. PROB. 241 (2001).
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conventional pretext analysis, the issue before the court is the 
historical question of what actual purpose motivated the strike.  
Under a mixed-motive analysis, however, the inquiry turns from the 
historical to the hypothetical, and the court must undertake the 
speculative inquiry not of what happened, but of what would have 
happened had the prosecutor not harbored an invidious purpose.  The 
speculative nature of the “but-for” inquiry has long been apparent to 
tort scholars.  Although sometimes the facts of a case make it 
seemingly easy to say that some consequence would not have 
occurred “but-for” some antecedent occurrence, at other times 
applying the but-for test “demands the impossible.”  As one scholar 
noted:
[I]t challenges the imagination of the trier to probe into 
a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs. He is 
invited to make an estimate concerning facts that 
concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to 
what might have happened opens the door wide for 
conjecture.240
The but-for question in a mixed-motive case requires a court 
to engage in pure speculation.  Assuming that the neutral reasons 
given by the proponent of the strike are credible, to answer the but-
for question, a court must first assess whether those reasons would 
have impelled the prosecutor to strike the juror or jurors absent the 
accompanying wrongful motive.  Moreover, the court cannot 
responsibly confine its inquiry to an evaluation of the juror or jurors 
that were struck, because the probability that a particular juror would 
have been struck does not depend solely on the characteristics of that 
juror. The decision to strike a juror depends on the comparative 
attractiveness of the other jurors in the venire.  Therefore, the court 
also must consider the prosecutor’s perceptions of the merits and 
demerits of all the other jurors who were not struck.241  Of course, 
240
 Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67 (1956).
241
 These problems may be further accentuated depending on the specific jury-selection 
practices used in different jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 257 
(Womack, J., dissentingt) (describing inherent difficulty of speculating whether any 
particular jury would have been struck in the absence of discriminatory animus given the 
nature of Texas’s “blind struck-jury” system in which all jurors are ranked in one list)
MIXED MOTIVES59
there normally will be no record of those assessments, and thus 
(except in the rare case where the neutral reasons given for a strike 
are based on truly glaring deficiencies), there is little basis on which 
a trial court can accurately assess the but-for question, aside from 
relying upon its own intuitive hunches about how jury selection is 
unfolding.242  Appellate courts reviewing mixed-motive challenges 
will lack even that minimal basis to review the trial court’s ruling.
Given the highly speculative nature of the inquiry, the 
tenuous nature of the evidence upon which that inquiry is based, and 
the importance of making equal protection principles operative in the 
jury selection process, recognizing the mixed-motive defense is 
contrary to Batson’s evidentiary goals.  Swain’s requirement that an 
objecting party adduce proof of a pattern of discrimination was 
abandoned precisely because it established an evidentiary hurdle that 
was practically insurmountable.  Adoption of mixed-motive analysis 
in the Batson context, however, replicates these evidentiary hurdles.
IV.RECLAIMING THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST 
Not only does use of mixed-motive analysis directly 
contravene Batson’s primary purposes, the original concerns that 
prompted the Court to devise the mixed-motive standard, which 
center on the problem of windfall limitation and harmless error, do 
not apply to Batson claims.  Mixed-motive analysis’s insistence on 
“but-for” causation is not appropriate in an antidiscrimination 
regime the primary purpose of which is to root out invidious bias 
rather than to compensate victims.  Instead, Batson and its progeny 
are best understood to bar any peremptory strike in which race, 
ethnicity, or gender was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor for its 
exercise.  Such an approach, which represents a modified version of 
the “taint theory,” reflects basic equal protection principles, relies 
upon traditional causation doctrines from the law of tort, and has 
powerful precedent: it is the same approach to mixed-motive that 
Congress has specified under Title VII.
242 See Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 927 (denying certiorari) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“But 
how is the factfinder to uncover the prosecutor’s intuitive reservations regarding the 
unchallenged white jurors? … No record memorializes the prosecvutor’s 
contemporaneous justifications for failing to challenge a juror.  Moreover, given the 
purely subjective nature of peremptory challenges, such a record could not be made.”).
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A. The Logic and Limits of the Title VII Analogy
The roadmap for resolving the mixed-motive problem in 
Batson can be found in the solution Congress adopted in the 1991 
Civil Rights Act to resolve the mixed-motive problem in Title VII.  
Although Justice Brennan made a partial case for using a 
“substantial factor” test to determine liability in mixed-motive Title 
VII cases, ultimately, the Price Waterhouse court rejected that test in 
favor of Mt. Health’s mixed-motive analysis, which allows the 
defendant to prevail as long as he can show that the improper motive 
was not the but-for cause of the decision.  In clarifying that liability 
ensues whenever an employer relies upon a prohibited criterion in 
making an employment decision, regardless of whether or not the 
“same decision” might have been made absent the criterion, 
Congress rejected the approach taken in Price Waterhouse. 243  Proof 
that a prohibited criterion was a “motivating factor” for an 
employment decision suffices to establish a violation under the Act.  
The 1991 Civil Rights Act thus underscores that the interpretive 
emphasis should be on the employer’s actual motivation rather than 
the strict question of causation.  
Title VII has long served as a guidepost in crafting the legal 
response to discrimination in jury selection.  In fact, Batson’s 
architecture was borrowed almost wholesale from two leading Title 
VII intentional discrimination cases, McDonnell Douglas v. Green244
and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine.245
Jurisprudentially speaking, it makes sense to look to Title VII as a 
guide, because the fundamental dynamics in both cases are 
remarkably similar. 246  As the Batson court framed it, the central 
issue in a peremptory challenge case is whether a juror was excluded 
“on account of race.”247  Title VII, which is part of a broader fabric of 
243 Price Waterhouse held that an employer that succeeded in proving that it would have 
made the “same decision” was not liable at all, which was overturned by the 1991 
Amendments.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
244
 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
245 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
246 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-98 nn.18-21 (noting relevance of Title VII “disparate
treatment” cases to “operation of prima facie burden of proof rules,” parameters of 
neutral explanation, and ultimate inquiry regarding intentional discrimination).
247
 476 U.S. at 89.
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employment discrimination law intended to eradicate discrimination 
from private employment decisionmaking,248 makes it unlawful for 
an employer, inter alia, “to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”249
The essential regulatory problem is thus very similar in Title 
VII and Batson.  An employer traditionally has been assumed to 
possess the right, within the normal parameters of contract law, to 
hire and fire employees at his or her discretion; that is, for any 
reason, or for no reason at all.  Title VII interferes with the 
employer’s traditionally broad discretion, but it does not purport to 
supplant it.250  As a result, Title VII permits employers to make 
employment decisions based on any criteria except those specifically 
enumerated by statute.251
Peremptory challenges, which have a historical pedigree as 
long as the “at-will” presumption in master-servant law,252 also 
assume unchecked discretion.  Like the traditional authority of 
employers to hire and fire without having to provide “cause,” 
248 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) (noting 
that Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967  “is but part of a wider statutory 
scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide” that includes Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V), 
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d)).
249 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2, 78 Stat. 255 (emphasis added).  This statutory language 
parallels Section Four of the 1875 Civil Rights Act provision dealing with jury selection, 
which provides that “no citizen possessing all other qualifications, which are or may be 
prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of 
the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”  Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 405 (Field, J., dissenting).
250
 Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 297 (noting that Title VII was not intended to 
“diminish traditional management prerogatives”).
251 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (noting that “Title VII 
eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving
employers’ freedom of choice”).
252 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 212-214 (explaining that peremptory challenges 
have “very old credentials,” were employed in England “[i]n all trials for felonies at 
common law,” and received specific mention by Congress in the 1790 Act, 1 Stat. 119 
(1790)).
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peremptory challenges need not be based on objective criteria, need 
not be explained or defended, and are not subject to “judicial 
scrutiny.”253  Just as Title VII did not impose a “for cause” 
requirement on employment relations, the Batson court did not seek 
to supplant the peremptory challenge regime with a “for cause” 
system of strikes.254  Instead, Batson, like Title VII, attempted to 
preserve a general regime of unrestricted discretion limited only by a 
small set of prohibited causes or reasons for the exercise of a 
peremptory strike.255  Although Batson’s critics have long observed 
that regulation of peremptory strikes exercised for improper reasons 
is logically problematic, given that peremptories have traditionally 
permitted the exclusion of jurors for any reason, or no reason at all,256
the Batson opinion itself took pains to assure that the proponent of a 
challenged strike need not give reasons for the strike that amount to 
“cause” for the strike.  
Given the similarities, the ultimate solution to the mixed-
motive problem adopted by Congress casts valuable light on the 
mixed-motive issue in Batson, and suggests that a comparable 
standard is warranted, whereby a Batson violation will be deemed 
complete in a mixed-motive case upon a showing that an improper 
bias was a motivating factor in the decision to strike a juror. Not 
only is this approach consistent with Title VII, it is also the approach 
used more generally in the analogous context of multiple sufficient 
causation tort cases.  
B. Substantial Factors and Multiple Sufficient Causation
As noted above, tort causation doctrine has long recognized 
that where an actor’s tortious conduct was an independent sufficient 
cause of an injury, the fact that other independent sufficient causes 
253
 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 211-212.
254 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.  Justice Marshall argued that the only way to prevent 
discrimination was to limit strikes to cause.  See id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
Justice Breyer has made similar arguments in several recent cases.  See, e.g., Miller-el v. 
Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
255 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.4 (noting that Congress expressly deleted the 
phrase ‘for cause’ “in favor of the phrase ‘for any reason other than’ one of the 
enumerated characteristics” when Title VII was enacted) (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-
2571 (1964)).
256
 U. S. ex rel. Darcy v. Handy  351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956).
MIXED MOTIVES63
also contributed to or caused the injury should not preclude 
recovery.257  As Justice Brennan argued in Price Waterhouse, a 
causally overdetermined event is, nonetheless, still the product of the 
causes that brought it about.258  Such cases are often said to involve 
“multiple sufficient causes.”259
Multiple sufficient cause cases are those in which an injury 
can be traced to two separate and distinct sources, each of which 
alone would have been sufficient to cause the injury.  One example 
of a multiple sufficient cause case involves two campers who 
negligently light campfires in a dry area.260  The fires converge, 
burning out of control, and causing a major forest fire.  Each of the 
fires alone would have been sufficient to cause the forest to burn.  
Because the forest fire would have occurred regardless of the 
individual negligence of each camper alone, under conventional 
causation principles, neither camper’s campfire was the “but-for” 
cause of the forest fire.  Nonetheless, courts consistently have held 
that under such circumstances, both campers face joint and several 
liability for the injury.261  The decision to relax causation standards 
reflects a policy-based consideration that causation standards must 
give way to the need to make sure that an innocent victim is not 
deprived of a remedy where any uncertainty regarding the causal 
mechanism of injury is attributable to wrongdoers.  
Multiple sufficient cause cases present harder problems, 
however, where one of the multiple sufficient causes was non-
257 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §432; Carpenter, supra note 27.  See supra
text accompanying nn. __.
258
 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
259 See David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1999). 
260 See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of 
Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 497-498 (2006).
261
 Fischer, supra note 244 at 1129-30.  In the classic multiple sufficient causation case, 
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), two hunters negligently shot in the 
direction of a third hunter, who suffered several gunshot wounds as a result.  Finding 
both hunters actions negligent, the court relieved the plaintiff of the burden to prove that 
either of the negligent hunters were the “but-for” cause of plaintiff’s injury.  See also, 
Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902) (where two motorcyclists ride 
simultaneously past a rider on horse-drawn wagon, frightening the horse and causing 
injury to the driver, both motorcyclists liable even though neither’s negligence was the 
“but-for” cause of plaintiff’s injury).
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tortious.  In that instance, some courts impose liability on the 
tortfeasor as long as “the tortfeasor’s conduct was a ‘substantial 
factor’ in producing the harm.”262  Other courts have declined to hold 
the defendant liable where an innocent source would have 
independently caused the loss in any event, on grounds that doing so 
puts the plaintiff in a better position than he would have been in 
absent the tortious conduct.263  Using the prior example, imagine that 
camper A negligently sets a fire that would have burned out of 
control, but that fire converges with a second fire started by 
lightning, that also would have burned out of control.  If A is held 
liable for the fire, then the plaintiff is in a better position than he 
would have been in, since the lightning would have caused the forest 
to burn in any event.
As Martin Katz argues, one party receives a windfall no 
matter which causation standard is invoked.264  If no but-for 
causation is required, then the plaintiff is made better off than he 
otherwise would have been.  However, if but-for causation is 
required, then the tortfeasor receives a windfall. After all, there is no 
dispute that the tortfeasor’s conduct was wrongful, and if not for the 
“fortuitous” fire, the tortfeasor would have been liable for the injury.
To the extent that the mixed-motive problem in 
discrimination cases can be (and has been) likened to the problem of 
multiple sufficient causes,265 it is technically more analogous to the 
latter case than the former, in that conduct motivated by mixed-
motives is said to be “caused” by both wrongful and innocent 
motives.  For two reasons, however, the multiple causation analogy 
counsels in favor of relaxing but-for causation in the mixed-motive 
context.
262
 Fischer, supra note __, at 1130; 490 U.S. at 263-264 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(noting that the multiple causation rule has been applied by courts where an innocent 
cause combines with a wrongful one to shift burden of proof to defendant to prove that 
his conduct was not the legal cause of the harm).
263 See Fischer, supra note __, at 1130.
264 See Katz, supra note 156, at 521 (noting that where two sufficient causes trigger the 
harm, “someone—either the plaintiff or the defendant—will always receive a windfall”).
265 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion); id. at 263-264 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).
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First, for policy reasons, overlooking a wrongful motive 
simply because the proponent of the strike can convince the trier of 
fact that the same result would have ensued allocates the “windfall” 
to the wrongdoer at the expense of the defendant, the juror, and the 
criminal justice system in general.  For the reasons explained above, 
strong policy arguments counsel against recognizing the validity of 
the mixed-motive defense in Batson cases.  Second, the purposeful 
exclusion of a juror on account of an invidious discriminatory 
purpose is not merely negligent, it is an intentional act,266 and as 
such, the causation standards applicable to intentional torts are more 
relevant than those applicable to negligent ones.  For good reason, 
where the actor’s conduct is intentional, tort law has long preferred 
the more relaxed causation standard applicable in cases of multiple 
tortious causes than the stricter causation requirement recognized in 
some multiple sufficient cause cases where a wrongful cause 
accompanies an innocent one.267  In intentional tort cases, the injury 
combined with the intent to cause it establish a sufficient equitable 
basis for liability as long as the actor’s conduct might be said to have 
contributed to the risk.  As the Restatement explains, where the actor 
acts with the purpose of causing “the harmful result which ensues, 
questions of legal causation are not pertinent except where the 
defendant’s act in no way has increased the risk of harm; it is enough 
that his act was a cause in fact or … was a substantial factor in 
causing the harm.”268
An attorney who strikes a juror for “mixed motives” in a 
Batson case acts with the purpose of causing the harmful result that 
266 Robert A. Kearney, The High Price Of Price Waterhouse: Dealing With Direct 
Evidence Of Discrimination, 5 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 303, 332 (2003) (noting that 
“discrimination is an intentional tort”).
267See W. Page Keeton et al., Prossor and Keeton of the Law of Torts § 8, at 37 (5th ed. 
1984). See also Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer's Holiday, 37 GA. 
L. REV. 1251, 1306 n.133 (2003) (“Because of the state of mind required to prove that a 
defendant is liable for an intentional tort, any intervening event, such as another person's 
negligence, typically does not break the chain of causation between the defendant's 
intentional act and any resulting harm that is a consequence of that intentional act.”); 
Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, The First Amendment v. The First Amendment: The Dilemma 
of Inherently Competing Rights in Free Speech-Based “Constitutional Torts,” 71 UMKC 
L. REV. 27, 54 (2002) (observing that causation standards in intentional tort cases are 
easier to satisfy than in unintentional tort cases).
268 REST. TORTS § 870 (c).
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in fact occurs, that is, excluding the juror from the venire, and in so 
doing, triggers Batson’s deterrent purposes.269  The presence of this 
wrongful motive, moreover, certainly increases the risk that the juror 
will in fact be excluded, even if there are other reasons or motives 
that also contributed to the juror’s exclusion.270  It follows, therefore, 
that as long as the wrongful motive was a “substantial” or 
“motivating” factor, the issue of but-for causation should be moot.  
The substantial factor test, “grounded in notions of equity and 
fairness,”271 places a priority on rooting out wrongful conduct rather 
than limiting damages, and it bars actors that have been proven to 
have acted wrongfully from escaping a liability determination 
simply because they can show that other causative forces were at 
work.272  Such an approach is much more consistent with the 
categorical language of equal protection, and more faithful to the 
court’s long-established efforts to root out discrimination from jury 
selection, than is mixed-motive analysis’s emphasis on windfall 
prevention.273
269 Cf. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Where an 
individual disparate treatment plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, 
the deterrent purpose of the statute has clearly been triggered.”)
270 See Katz, supra note 156, at 518-519 (noting that use of improper criterion in 
decisionmaking regardless of but-for causation is harmful because “the utilization of 
protected characteristics increases the risk of an adverse ultimate employment decision”).
271
 Brodin, supra note 202, at 317.
272 See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A 
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990) (discussing tort 
law multiple causation doctrine).
273
 Of course, the multiple sufficient cause analogy has serious analytical shortcomings.  
The most significant difference between a mixed-motive case and a multiple sufficient 
cause case is that “motives” are not the equivalent of distinct “causes.”  Unlike a multiple 
causation tort case, there is only one wrongdoer. At issue is not the causal effects of the 
actor’s chosen conduct, but the proper characterization of the actor’s mental state in 
choosing the conduct.  The closest analogy may not be a tort analogy at all, but rather a 
criminal law analogy. Numerous crimes require proof that the defendant acted with a 
particular purpose or intent for conviction.  Take burglary, for example.  To prove 
burglary under the common law, the state must prove, inter alia, that the defendant 
entered a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein. A defendant who breaks 
and enters a dwelling for a non-felonious purpose is not guilty of the offense.  Now 
consider the case of the “mixed-motive” burglar, who breaks into a home 1) to warm 
himself, and 2) to steal food.  Imagine further that it is a very cold night, and the 
defendant can prove at trial that he would have entered the house solely to escape the 
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The substantial factor standard helpfully supplements the 
“taint” approach adopted by several courts.  Although the taint 
approach suggests that any indication or suggestion of an improper 
purpose might suffice to establish an equal protection violation, a 
standard that could be triggered by the mere mention of an improper 
criteria risks delegitimizing Batson by establishing a standard courts 
would simply refuse to enforce.  The motivating/substantial factor 
standard has already been utilized in the Court’s Batson case law,274
and is familiar to courts in other contexts.  The approach specifically 
defines the plaintiff’s proof burden in terms consistent with well-
established equal protection doctrine.  Courts that have adopted the 
“taint” approach have acknowledged that peremptory strikes 
exercised even in part for wrongful purposes undermine Batson’s 
purposes.275  The substantial factor test, as used in Title VII liability 
determinations and in various analogous tort contexts, clarifies that 
the threshold to trigger a finding of taint is the finding that a 
discriminatory purpose was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor is 
one that violates the equal protection clause as a matter of law. 
Applied to Batson disputes, a substantial factor test would 
marginally strengthen the protections against the discriminatory use 
of peremptory strikes, and marginally narrow the power of litigants 
to strike jurors on the basis of arbitrary criteria.  At least one sitting 
justice is on record as opposing the institution of peremptory strikes 
altogether.276  Rejection of mixed-motive analysis, and reliance on 
cold. In other words, his motive of stealing food was not the “but-for” cause of the break-
in.  Despite the presence of mixed-motives, such a defendant is almost certainly guilty.  
The relevant question is not whether there were “non-criminal” motives sufficient to 
explain the defendant’s conduct, but whether there was any culpable intent present.
Because discrimination in jury selection is an affirmative wrong, it may be 
preferable to treat the intent question as one of culpability rather than one of causation.  A 
prosecutor who admits to an invidious bias and who proceeds to follow a course of action 
consistent with it is culpable, regardless of any other innocent motives also consistent 
with that course of action. 
274 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003); Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 360 (1991).
275
 As the South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned, “any consideration of discriminatory 
factors in this decision is in direct contravention of the purpose of Batson which is to 
ensure peremptory strikes are executed in a nondiscriminatory manner.”  Payton v. 
Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 60 (1998)
276 See Miller-el v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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the substantial factor test, would be far less disruptive of the jury-
selection process than abolition of peremptory strikes.  Indeed, its 
adoption is unlikely to have any measurable impact on prosecutorial 
power. Continued availability of the “for cause” strike removes the 
possibility that truly biased jurors will be empaneled.  The converse 
is not true.  Widespread recognition of the availability of the mixed-
motive defense might lead to widespread changes in the way 
prosecutor’s respond at step two of the Batson inquiry, and could 
further weaken the ability of courts to prevent trial attorneys from 
using peremptory strikes for discriminatory purposes.   
C. The Windfall Problem 
Of course, Title VII does reserve a place for the “same 
decision” defense, but it limits it to the choice of remedies.  Title VII 
actions, and constitutional tort cases like Mt. Healthy, routinely 
involve potentially large compensatory awards.  On the outcome 
often hinges momentous effects on the plaintiffs’ careers, such as 
tenure for Doyle in Mt. Healthy and partnership for Hopkins in Price 
Waterhouse.  The windfall problem is heightened where there is an 
element of comparative negligence and the award of damages 
requires a selection between two at-fault parties.  In Mt. Healthy and 
Price Waterhouse, for example, adverse employment decisions were 
made both because of improper criteria used by the employer and in 
part based on the plaintiffs’ alleged performance deficiencies.  The 
but-for causation rule protects one wrongdoing party from being 
obligated to compensate another absent strong proof that the 
defendant’s wrongdoing caused the harm.  
The Mt. Healthy mixed-motive test fashioned its causation 
standard not from tort law, however, but from approaches to 
remedies in exclusionary rule cases.  Enforcement of the 
exclusionary rule often means abandoning reliable evidence of guilt, 
and sometimes abandoning a prosecution against a verifiably guilty 
person.  Like tort cases and other actions for monetary damages, 
therefore, enforcement of the exclusionary rule also “provides some 
defendants with a windfall.”277  Because of the strong public policy 
277 See Akhil Reed Amar, THE C ONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 28-29 (1997); Karlan, supra note 201, at 2015.
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interest that probative evidence not be excluded from trial unless 
absolutely necessary to vindicate the purposes of constitutional law, 
the Supreme Court has held in a long series of cases that the 
exclusionary rule remedy must be narrowly drawn.  For instance, 
even if the accused initially demonstrates that evidence admitted 
against him was “a fruit of the poisonous tree,” it remains available 
to the “Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an 
independent origin,”278 that it inevitably would have been 
discovered,279 or that some intervening independent cause rendered 
the connection between the unlawful conduct and the outcome “‘so 
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’”280  Each of these defenses 
permits the government, in effect, to use the fruits of unlawful 
searches or interrogations notwithstanding that the unlawful conduct 
was a causal factor – and probably even a “substantial factor” – in its 
discovery.  The narrowing limitations on the poisonous tree doctrine 
were adopted notwithstanding that their availability inevitably 
diminishes the marginal deterrent value of the exclusionary rule and 
raises concerns regarding the judicial integrity of the tribunals that 
permit the evidence to be so used.281
Whereas tort law balances the goals of corrective justice with 
those of optimally apportioning the costs of accidents among the 
parties,282 the constitutional criminal procedure cases invoked by 
Rehnquist in Mt. Healthy reflect a concern with fashioning the least 
intrusive remedial scheme consistent with the goal of deterring 
unconstitutional conduct.283  Given the virtual absence of any 
278
 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
279
 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-448 (1984).
280
 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 
(1939).
281 See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 817 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that independent source exception to poisonous tree doctrine will “provide 
government agents with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional violations 
of the privacy of the home”).
282 See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26 (1970) (discussing public-regarding purposes of tort law).
283
 As Justice Stevens has explained, the Court has not mechanically applied the 
exclusionary rule “to every item of evidence that has a causal connection with police 
misconduct.”  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 825 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
“‘The notion of the 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the 
detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent 
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countervailing interest in corrective justice by a defendant seeking to 
exclude probative evidence of guilt at trial, the optimal level of 
deterrence is quite low.  The exclusionary rule jurisprudence’s 
emphasis on deterrence places the analytical focus on the wrongdoer 
rather than the victim, and the remedies are designed with an 
emphasis not on restoring the victim to the position he would have 
been in “but-for” the wrongdoing, but in depriving the state of the 
fruits of its wrongful conduct in order to put the state back in the 
position it would have occupied absent the violation.  
The enforcement of Batson, however, does not pose any 
comparable risk of overcompensation.  Although equal protection in 
jury selection was first recognized as an element of the right to a fair 
trial, 284 limitations on the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes 
are not solely, or even principally, designed to remedy a cognizable 
injury to the litigant.  A defendant may have an interest in assuring 
that members of his or her own racial, ethnic, or gender group are 
not excluded based on those criteria, but there is no requirement that 
a defendant prove that the exclusion of a juror on account of an 
improper criteria actually affected the outcome of the case or 
otherwise harmed the defendant.285
Unlike in exclusionary rule cases or actions for monetary 
damages, therefore, enforcement of the Batson right at trial does not 
result in any obvious tangible gain for the defendant.286  One of the 
premises of Batson is that exclusions predicated on race, ethnicity, 
effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.’”  Id. (quoting Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975)(Powell, J., concurring in part).
284
 The defendant’s interest in assuring that members of his racial group are not 
discriminatorily excluded, however, was the initial harm that equal protection doctrine 
acknowledged.  See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881) (stating that a citizen is 
entitled to a right ‘“that in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, 
there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimiantion against them, because of 
their their color’”) (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879)).
285 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s 
decision to permit Batson challenges where defendant and struck juror are not members 
of same group because majority  “does not even pretend that the peremptory challenges 
here have caused this defendant tangible injury and concrete harm”).
286
 Compare Batson motions with Fourth or Fifth Amendment suppression motions.  In 
the latter cases, the defendant who prevails at the suppression hearing obtains a quite 
substantial benefit: the exclusion of probative evidence. The suppression remedy is so 
potent, in fact, that it often results in practice in the dismissal of charges altogether.  
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or gender are illogical and, therefore, that reliance on such criteria 
does not even advance the rational interests of the striking party.  
Even if that premise is relaxed, the benefit that accrues to a party 
prevailing in a Batson dispute is highly ethereal.  In denying a party 
the ability to exercise a peremptory strike, the court does not force 
the party to accept a juror as to whom there is an objective basis to 
suspect bias – any such juror could be struck for cause.  
The costs of strictly enforcing Batson at trial are de minimis –
at most, a juror who one of the parties has an unsubstantiated hunch 
or belief will view the case less favorably than others will sit on the 
jury.287  Even assuming that these hunches are accurate more often 
than not (an assumption not necessarily supported by empirical 
evidence), the litigants’ marginal decrease in control over the jury 
panel is compensated by the marginal increase in the number of 
minority jurors that will sit on juries, enhancing the public 
perception of integrity, fairness, and impartiality of the jury system.  
The proper enforcement of Batson claims by the trial court thus 
simply does not threaten to reward defendants with any “windfall.”
The remedy of appellate reversal for a Batson violation can 
look like a “windfall” in some instances – particularly where there is 
no reason to believe that the violation made any difference to the 
outcome, or where retrial is not practically possible – but the 
apparent windfall only results from the trial court’s error.288  The 
question whether the remedy of reversal is appropriate to correct 
trial court error, however, is fundamentally different from the 
question of whether zealous enforcement of the right in question 
itself risks unfairly rewarding litigants or criminal defendants.289  The 
287
 The two remedies for a Batson violation detected during jury selection are 1) 
overruling the strike and empaneling the juror, and 2) calling a new venire.  Although the 
latter remedy is obviously more onerous than the former, it is still far less onerous than 
retrial.  See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391, 1436 (2001) (describing trial court remedies and noting that 
“once a decision favorable to the challenger is made the corrective action is easy”).
288 See Peter Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 713, 791 (1999) (arguing that lack of harmless error review of Batson violations 
creates perception of windfall when defendant successfully challenges a conviction on 
appeal).
289
 This distinction may not seem so significant to appellate courts who must decide 
whether to penalize an apparent violation with the reversal remedy, and because they 
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harmless error doctrine has been developed to address this different 
kind of windfall problem, but for reasons discussed below, that 
doctrine has not been applied to Batson violations and, for the same 
reasons, mixed-motive analysis should not be permitted to serve as a 
substitute. 
D. Harmless Error
It is well-established that Batson errors are exempt from 
harmless error review.  The harmless error doctrine is predicated on 
the assumption that it is normally possible to isolate the effects of a 
procedural error and assess whether the error likely had an impact on 
the outcome.  Such types of “trial errors” include the admission of 
improper evidence,290 errors in instructing the jury,291 and improper 
comments to the jury.292  However, errors the effects of which are 
impossible to trace (such as the total deprivation of the right to 
counsel293) or which trench upon interests unrelated to the reliability 
of the proceedings (such as violation of the right to a public trial294) 
are considered “structural errors” that are not subject to harmless 
error review.  Like the failure to provide counsel to a defendant, 
Batson errors are “structural errors,” the effects of which are 
impossible to isolate or trace.295  Given the practical impossibility of 
proving that exclusion of any one juror would have changed the 
outcome at trial, adoption of a harmless error doctrine in Batson
cases would effectively remove appellate courts from enforcement 
of Batson.  As a result, an appellate court finding of a Batson
cannot “calibrate the remedy,” as a result, appellate courts are undoubtedly tempted to 
“fudge on the right instead.”  Karlan, supra note 201, at 2015.
290 See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (admission of evidence in 
violation of Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause deemed harmless in capital sentencing 
proceeding).
291 See, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (erroneous jury instruction 
containing conclusive presumption deemed harmless error).
292 See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on 
defendant’s invocation of right to silence deemed harmless error).
293 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (describing deprivation of right 
to counsel as a structural error not subject to harmless error review).
294 See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984)
295 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
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violation results in a per se reversal.296  Although automatic reversal 
is a serious threat, and might be perceived as a windfall for the 
defendant, it serves an important function.  The threat of reversal 
creates powerful incentives for trial judges to ensure that jury 
selection is not infected by racial discrimination.  
No doubt, the impetus toward the adoption of mixed-motive 
analysis can be explained in part by the problems created by the 
combination of per se reversal and retroactive application of 
Batson’s more demanding standard to trials conducted before it was 
decided.  Many of the lower federal court decisions, including 
Howard v. Senkowski, that adopted mixed-motive analysis involved 
pre-Batson trials.  Undoubtedly, courts are naturally hesitant to 
overturn convictions where there is no evidence of obvious 
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor nor any obvious reason to 
doubt the reliability of the conviction.  In convictions obtained prior 
to Batson, where prosecutors did not know that race or gender-based 
peremptory strikes were strictly unlawful, it is understandable that 
reviewing courts might be tempted to downplay the seriousness of 
the constitutional violation.297  Some appellate court decisions that 
have affirmed the use of mixed motive analysis in Batson cases 
reflect what appears to be a presumption that the admitted 
discrimination was de minimis.  Such a conclusion is easy to justify 
in a mixed motive case, since the prosecutor’s purposes are 
obscured.  The turn to mixed motive analysis in these cases has 
functioned as a mechanism to avoid what otherwise would be 
mandatory reversal – i.e. as a de facto harmless error doctrine.  But 
harmless error review is not appropriate in this context.
A mixed-motive finding is the equivalent of a finding that the 
discrimination did not matter to the outcome; it was irrelevant.  For 
296 See, e.g., Tankleff v. Senkowski,135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Leonard 
L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure ot Meet the 
Challenge of Discriminaitoin in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 501, 544 (noting 
critically that “the typical appellate court that finds a Batson violation will simply reverse 
the conviction outright, without a consideration of whether or not the Batson error was 
harmless” and suggesting that harmless error review should be adopted).
297
 The same dynamic was apparent in the wake of Miranda.  See, e.g., Michigan v. 
Tucker, (upholding conviction notwithstanding failure of interrogating officers to 
administer one of the Miranda warnings, where three other warnings were given and 
there was no reason for officer to know that fourth warning was required).
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reasons similar to those that preclude harmless error review in 
Batson cases in general, that argument should not be permitted in the 
mixed-motive context either.  As a practical evidentiary matter, it is 
virtually impossible to reliably determine the effect of the 
discriminatory bias on the decisions made by an attorney during jury 
selection.  Evidence that bias influenced that process should be 
sufficient to establish a violation, and permitting a party that has 
relied in part on discriminatory criteria to escape sanction by 
convincing a court that they would have made the “same decision” 
anyway effectively “shields wrongdoers from liability.”298  Such a 
rule is easier to implement and preserves the role of appellate courts 
in policing jury selection to effectuate the goals of equal protection.  
In addition, the reluctance to penalize prosecutors for failure to 
comply with standards not yet articulated is no longer valid.  After 
twenty years of living with Batson, every trial lawyer is on notice 
that she may not exercise peremptory strikes on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, or gender.  There is far less justification for a quasi-
harmless-error doctrine now than there was a decade earlier.  
The use of mixed-motive analysis in Arlington Heights points 
to a second, and more subtle, kind of harmless error review.  Where 
judicial review of legislative or administrative rulemaking is 
concerned, courts have a practical concern with the preservation of 
judicial capital and resources.  Courts abhor decisions on questions 
that are “moot” or not yet ripe, and generally seek on grounds of 
futility to avoid issuing edicts that can be easily circumvented.  
Challenges to legislative or administrative enactments based on 
purported unlawful motive raise precisely those kinds of concerns.  
After all, if a legislature can simply repass the same statute, but 
simply articulate a different justification for it, the initial finding of 
unconstitutionality will seem rather pointless.299  The mixed-motive 
298 See Katz, supra note 156, at 517 (noting frequency of criticism of but-for causation 
test as shielding wrongdoers from liability).
299 See Palmer v. Thompson  403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (explaining that “there is an 
element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of 
its supporters” because “[I]f the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of 
its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or 
relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons”); Brest, supra note 38, at 126 
(discussing argument against judicial review of legislative motives based on fear that 
review will be futile, because “a particular decisionmaker whose law is once struck down 
MIXED MOTIVES75
test articulated in Arlington Heights saves the courts, and the 
legislature or administrative body, that trouble by providing that if 
there is a permissible reason for the statute that would have resulted 
in its passage anyway, the court should keep its powder dry.
The futility justification, however, does not apply to Batson
disputes.  Although prosecutors possess the discretion initially to 
remove virtually anyone from the jury with a peremptory strike, the 
legitimacy of the strike stands or falls on the legitimacy of the 
reasons articulated in their defense.  Unlike in the legislative context, 
where nothing stops the legislature from reenacting the same bill, 
prosecutors who lose Batson motions may not strike the same juror 
again after they think up a better reason.300  Discretionary abuses in 
using peremptory strikes result in the permanent inability to make 
the “same decision” later.  Accordingly, there is far less justification 
for permitting a “same-decision” defense where it already has been 
established the initial decision was substantially influenced by 
discrimination.
Batson cases thus raise no windfall problems if they are 
properly resolved at trial, and harmless error review for mistakes 
made by the trial court is no more warranted in mixed-motive cases 
than in a simple, single motive case.  For these reasons, and given 
the symbolic, deterrent, and evidentiary goals underlying Batson, the 
proper approach to mixed-motive cases in Batson is the approach 
Congress adopted under Title VII.  Defendants bringing Batson
challenges should not be required to prove anything more than “that 
race or another forbidden criterion was a motivating factor in the 
because it was illicitly motivated will readopt the law, retaining his illicit motivation but 
taking care to conceal it”).
300
 Not only does the prosecutor lack a second chance to strike a juror when a Batson
objection is upheld, she also can not “save” a strike that was exercised for what later is 
acknowledged to be an improper reason by showing that there were other adequate 
reasons for the strike.  On appeal, the question for the reviewing court is not whether the 
prosecutor might have had good reasons for striking a juror, but solely whether the 
prosecutor's real reasons were permissible.  See Johnson, 125 S.Ct. at 2418; Miller-El,
125 S.Ct. at 2332 (“A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up 
any rational basis.”).
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decision.”301 Batson’s non-remedial purposes are better served by a 
rule that precludes the use of peremptory strikes that are even in part 
motivated by discriminatory animus.302  The substantial or 
motivating factor test, which reflects basic equal protection 
principles, better serves the goals of assuring that the defendant is 
tried by a fairly selected jury, that no juror will be excluded from 
jury service on account of his or race, ethnicity, or gender, and that 
the criminal justice system itself remains unblemished by 
discriminatory animus. 
CONCLUSION
The expansion and consolidation of the Batson doctrine 
represents a widespread legal and social recognition that 
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender is 
fundamentally unacceptable, and marks a triumph of equal 
protection principles.  But the story is not one of unmitigated 
success.  Increased recognition that overtly discriminatory jury 
selection practices are unacceptable has brought increased 
sophistication in masking or hiding the selection criteria actually 
employed.  This increased sophistication requires more rigorous 
enforcement of Batson.  Mixed-motive analysis, however, portends 
just the opposite.  Mixed-motive analysis fundamentally dilutes 
Batson’s protections by permitting prosecutors to exclude jurors 
notwithstanding an express admission of an invidious intent.  
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the propriety of 
mixed motive analysis, but it cannot dodge the issue forever – the 
storm is gathering.  Widespread acceptance of mixed motive will 
almost certainly lead to the evisceration of Batson’s already minimal 
protections.  Shortly after Price Waterhouse was decided, Congress 
amended Title VII to provide that a plaintiff who establishes that a 
301
 Brodin, supra note 202, at 317 (arguing that deterrent goals of Title VII counsel 
against requiring plaintiffs, for liability purposes, in Title VII cases to prove more than 
that illicit criteria was a motivating factor in decision).
302 Cf. Malone, supra note 247, at 91 (arguing in favor of substantial factor test: “If the 
fire started by plaintiff was sizeable and merges with another fire, why must the court 
require the jury to make an estimate at plaintiff’s risk as to whether defendant’s fire 
would have worked the same destruction unaided? If the flames he caused to be put into 
motion were actively playing a part, is it not enough to inquire whether that part was 
sufficient to warrant an imposition of liability”).
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discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in an adverse 
employment decision has prevailed for purposes of establishing her 
employer’s liability.  The amended Act clarified that the mixed-
motive defense, while available, is only relevant to limiting available 
remedies.  Congress has thus unequivocally declared that any 
adverse employment action that was motivated, even in part, by a 
discriminatory purpose contravenes the basic antidiscrimination 
purposes underlying the law.
 That recognition is equally valid in the jury selection context.  
As under Title VII, demonstration of even one discriminatory motive 
should suffice to establish a Batson violation.  After all, “[t]he mere 
existence of discriminatory practices in jury selection ‘cast[s] doubt 
on the integrity of the whole judicial process.’”303 This conclusion is 
especially warranted because Batson’s safeguards are so easily 
overcome by prosecutors intent on discriminating in jury selection, 
and because the evidence available to determine whether a strike 
was exercised for an improper purpose is so elusive.304  Because 
there is no opportunity to take discovery, no ability to examine the 
prosecutor directly, and no other way to substantiate a discrimination 
claim except through reliance on the explanation provided by the 
prosecutor, Batson will be ineffective unless its step-two neutrality 
requirement is rigorously enforced. In those rare cases where there is 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, failure to recognize an equal 
protection violation under Batson would undermine the “Court’s 
unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination” from jury 
selection.305  Mixed motive analysis applied in the context of 
discriminatory peremptory strikes is unnecessary, unworkable, and 
in conflict with the basic purposes for which Batson was crafted.  
The Supreme Court should say so.
303 United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972))
304 See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 322.
305 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
